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One of the odd paradoxes of the study of religious gap between Muslims of first-generation of 
immigration and those belonging to second- or later generation of immigration in the European 
context is that quantitative studies show little evidence for difference while qualitative studies 
point out significant differences. Why is it so? By focusing on the French case and taking a 
mixed methods approach, I reflect on this paradox. First, I analyze data from three quantitative 
surveys: Pew Global Attitudes Survey (Pew 2006), Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO 2008), 
and French Institute of Public Opinion study of the Muslim population (IFOP 2019). Then, I use 
primary qualitative data (25 interviews and field observations) collected in the Greater Paris 
region over six months (May-July 2018 and February-April 2019) to outline five themes that I 
noted when my interviewees talked about religious generational gap. These themes include: 
choice versus inheritance of Islam; Islamic epistemologies; religious attitudes towards gender 
and ethnic differences; dividing the sacred from the profane; and claiming Islamic identity. I 
show that many of the religious differences that French Muslims of different immigrant 
generations talk about are not measured by the quantitative surveys currently available. In 
conclusion, I use the five themes to propose survey questions that can be used in future 
quantitative surveys to measure the existence of as well as the nature of religious generational 
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Section 1: Introduction 
Every Friday after the afternoon prayer, a women’s group meets at the Grand Mosque of 
Paris. Quranic verses are discussed and thoughts are shared, in a mixture of French and North 
African Arabic dialects, about ways in which to apply Quran’s lessons in daily life. Many of 
these women are first-generation immigrants, and a popular discussion is the religious 
generational differences they have with their French-raised children or grandchildren. During my 
Friday visits to the mosque, many complained that the “younger” generation of Muslim women 
and men in France wore hijab or grew “Islamic” beard while “knowing nothing about the 
essence of Islam” (Houda’s words).1 Second-generation women who frequented the mosques 
usually chatted with those of their own immigrant-generation, complaining about the 
“incomprehension of Islam among the parents” who had not read the Quran and did not 
understand that Muslim women “could marry any man as long as they are pious Muslims [and 
that] it did not matter what ethnic background they came from” (Nesrine’s words, fieldnotes 
from March 2019). 
That religious generational gap with members of other immigrant-generation exists was a social 
fact for many Muslim women and men I met both within and outside the mosques (Durkheim 
 
1 The second- and third-generation immigrants were collectively referred to as “youth” or “younger (wo)men” by 




1982).2 Among the first-generation men I conversed with at the immigrant-dominated cafes in 
northern Paris, and among second- and third-generation women and men I shared meals with 
during religious association meetings, many agreed with the women I met at the Grand Mosque 
about the existence of a religious generational gap between first-generation immigrants and 
French-raised descendants of these immigrants.3  
Scholars who employ qualitative methods agree that there is a generational gap in religiosity, i.e. 
the religiosity of first-generation Muslims in France is different from that of their second- and 
third-generation descendants; however, those employing quantitative surveys have discovered 
little consistent evidence of a generational gap in religiosity among Muslims in either France or 
elsewhere in Europe.  
For example, a survey carried out by IFOP (French Institute of Public Opinion) in 2019 asked 
Muslim women and men of age 50 years and above if they would “say that in your family, your 
entourage or your neighborhood, the young Muslims you know are today more religious, less 
religious or neither more nor less religious than your generation was at the same age?”4 Around 
 
2 In this paper, I borrow from Danièle Hervieu-Léger's definition that “a religion is an ideological, practical, and 
symbolic device by which a consciousness (individual or collective) of belonging to a particular believing line is 
constituted, maintained, [and] developed” (cited in Kakpo 2005: 140). 
3 In the context of this paper, I define first-generation immigrants as those who immigrated to France, and second- 
and third-generation immigrants are those who were born in France to (at least) a parent or grand-parent who 
immigrated to France. It should be noted that second- and third-generation as categories are not used by my 
interviewees; rather, they prefer to be called first- or second-generation French respectively. In following the general 
practice in sociological literature on immigration, I use the terms “second-generation immigrant” and “third-
generation immigrant.” I also refer to the second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants as French-born or 
French-raised Muslims collectively.  
4 The question asked was “Diriez-vous que dans votre famille, votre entourage ou votre quartier, les jeunes 
musulmans que vous connaissez sont aujourd’hui plus religieux, moins religieux ou ni plus ni moins religieux que ne 
l’était votre génération au même âge?” Unfortunately, a similar question was not asked to the younger Muslim 
population and hence we have no proxy for whether second- and third-generation Muslims thought that there was a 
generation gap with first-generation. 
3 
 
half of them agreed that there was a religious gap, 40 percent said that there was no difference, 
and around 9 percent did not respond. Of those who agreed, 55 percent said that the younger 
generation was “more religious” and 45 percent said that the younger generation was “less 
religious.”5 
This paper takes this discrepancy in evidence related to religious generational gap as the starting 
point. Using a mixed methods approach, I reflect on how results from qualitative case studies can 
be bridged with those from quantitative survey data to understand religious generational gap as a 
sociological phenomenon. I argue that new quantitative survey data is needed to capture the 
varied manifestations of religious generational gap that are identified in the qualitative literature 
and in my interviews with Muslims in France. These issues are important because many 
Europeans view religiosity among Muslim immigrants and their descendants as a proxy for 
integration into the society (Alba 2005; Zolberg and Woon 1999), i.e. lower religiosity among 
French-raised Muslims compared with that among first-generation immigrants is often 
interpreted as integration into largely secular societies in Europe.  
The paper is organized as follows: The first part of the paper sketches out the debates and 
propositions in the literature in relation to the presence (or the absence) of religious generational 
gap. Second, I examine results from available quantitative surveys – I compare indicators of 
religiosity for foreign-born (or first-generation) and French-born (second- or third-generation) 
Muslims in France to see if we can find significant differences in religiosity between the two 
generational groups, especially for observables/outcomes mentioned in the qualitative studies. I 
 
5 Here, I am taking age group as a proxy for immigrant-generation, assuming that those who are aged 50 and above 
are mostly (if not all) first-generation Muslims. I remain aware of the limitations of this assumption, in that this 
group might consist of Muslims of other generation as well as converts.    
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find that while quantitative survey data provides no generalizable evidence of the presence of 
religious generational gap, many among my interviewees as well as others I interacted with 
while collecting qualitative data talked about the existence of a religious generational gap (in 
many cases without me prompting them to). Third, I use this primary qualitative data (interviews 
and observations) collected among Muslims of immigrant origin in France to outline five key 
themes of generational differences identified by my interlocutors. In conclusion, I propose 
survey questions based on these themes that might be used to collect better-quality survey data 
on religiosity among European Muslims.6  
  
 
6 It remains true that census-level data related to religious affiliation, religiosity, and ethnicity cannot be collected in 
France. As Michael Cosgrove writes, “A law dating from 1872 forbids the collection by the state of census data 
based on questions about religious beliefs, because the Third Republic considered that kind of information to be 
private. This principle was reaffirmed in a law passed on 6 January 1978 (Article 8) which states that “It is forbidden 
to collect or process data of a personal nature related to racial or ethnic origins as well as political, philosophic or 
religious opinions.”” (See Michael Cosgrove. 2011. “How does France count its Muslim population?” Le Figaro. 
http://plus.lefigaro.fr/note/how-does-france-count-its-muslim-population-20110407-435643 for more details on the 
topic.) Yet, the door remains open for smaller representative surveys like Trajectories and Origins (2008) to ask 





Section 2: Religious generational gap in the literature 
In this section, I review evidence on religious generational gap among Muslims of 
immigrant origin, primarily in France but also in other European countries with significant 
Muslim population of immigrant origin. I start with a review of studies that make use of 
quantitative survey data, and then review evidence from qualitative studies. 
2.1 Evidence from Quantitative studies 
Quantitative studies use shifts in religiosity of immigrant-origin Muslims over immigrant 
generation to measure integration into the predominantly secular societies of European countries. 
These studies ask: Is there a secularization of Muslims from first-generation to second-
generation? Secularization in these studies is understood as “the decreasing importance and 
impact of religion in modern societies” (Phalet, Gijsberts, and Hagendoorn 2008:412).  
Studies from around Europe agree that there is a significant intergenerational transmission of 
religiosity among Muslims from first- to second-generation (Brouard and Tiberj 2011; Güngör, 
Fleischmann, and Phalet 2011; Soehl 2017).  
One of the earliest surveys to study trajectories of immigrants in France, titled “Geographical 
Mobility and Social Inclusion” (MGIS), was fielded in 1992 by the French Institute for 
Demographic Studies (INED) and National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). 
This study allows us to compare religiosity of first-generation with that of second-generation 
immigrants from Algeria. Data for this study were analyzed by Michèle Tribalat (1995, 1996), 
who also directed the collection of data. In terms of religious practice, we see a decrease over 
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immigrant generation. We see that, in the first-generation, around 47 percent of men and 58 
percent of women indicate that they practice religion either regularly or occasionally. On the 
other hand, among those of second generation with two Algerian parents, 32 percent of men and 
42 percent of women indicate practicing religion regularly or occasionally. This proportion is 
even less among children of one Algerian and one French parent. Among the first-generation, 
between 70-80 percent respect Ramadan fasting and religious restrictions on consumption of 
pork meat. The proportion of those who respect restriction on consumption of alcohol is around 
55 percent (men) and 76 percent (women) (1996:240). Among the children of two Algerian 
parents, around 60 percent respect Ramadan fasting and religious restrictions on consumption of 
pork meat and about half of them respect religious restriction on the consumption of alcohol 
(1996:248). In terms of language used, around half of the first-generation population declare 
Arabic as their maternal language and an additional 24 percent declare using a mix of Arabic, 
Berber, and French (1996:190). On the other hand, only 10 percent of those born of two Algerian 
parents declare Arabic as a mother tongue and an additional 28 percent declare speaking a 
mixture of French and Arabic (1996:203). Hence, overall, we see a decline in the use of Arabic 
language over immigrant generation.7  
In 2005, Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj fielded data in order to compare “the new French” 
with “French” people who lack direct links to immigration. Their findings do not allow us to 
compare the two immigrant generations, unfortunately; yet, they compare age cohorts and 
conclude that there is a move toward “reislamization” among the younger cohort. They use data 
for the question that asked Muslims “if they accord more, as much, or less importance to religion 
 
7 Arabic language knowledge and fluency are used to make claims of religious authenticity and authority among 
Muslims and hence is an important indicator of transmission of Islam over generations.  
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today than they did before” and find that, overall, the distribution for the three categories was at 
42 percent (more), 41 percent (as much), and 17 percent (less). The percent of those who 
indicated that the importance of religion for them is higher at the time of the interview than it 
was before was highest among 18-24 year old individuals (Brouard and Tiberj 2011:17).  
Hakim el Karoui (2016) published a report titled “A French Islam is possible” using data from a 
quantitative survey on Muslim religiosity that was fielded in 2016. Data from 1,029 individuals 
of “Muslim faith or culture” was obtained (of which 874 self-identified as Muslim). El Karoui 
concludes that those “far removed from religion” comprise about half of respondents aged 40 
and above, as compared with a third of younger respondents to conclude that there might be a 
trend of “strengthening of religious identity among the new cohorts (compared to their elders at 
the same age)” (p.19).8 He cautions that “[a]t this stage, it is not possible to statistically verify 
that this impact is linked to age rather than to a generational effect” (p.19) yet argues that overall 
there is a rise in fundamentalism especially among those of younger generation.  
Several recent works on the study of immigrant religiosity in France have used data from the 
Trajectories and Origins (TeO 2008) survey, which I analyze later in this paper. Using TeO 
(2008) data, Thomas Soehl (2017) shows that “the offspring of religiously non-homogamous 
families are significantly less religious” (p.1001). He concludes that there is a possibility of an 
overall “non-trivial decline in religiosity of the third-generation” because of decline in religious 
in-partnering in the second-generation (p.999).9 Hugues Lagrange (2013) studies shifts in the 
 
8 The data used for this report remains private, given that it was collected by two private institutions: Montaigne 
Institute and French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP). I have attempted to get access to this data, but received no 
response from the institutions.  
9 Simon and Tiberj (2013) also come to a similar conclusion using the same dataset – that intermarriage over 
generation rather than immigrant generation itself (directly) is contributing to decrease in religiosity over immigrant 
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religiosity of immigrants in France overall. Among others, he compares data on the religiosity of 
first- and second-generation immigrants of Algerian descent using data from MGIS (1992) and 
TeO (2008). He shows that while there was a significant difference between the proportion of 
those who declared themselves to have a religious affiliation in 1992 in both generations (around 
85 percent among first- and 70 percent among second-generation), in 2008 this gap is almost 
non-existent (around 90 percent of both groups declare having religious affiliation) (p.13). This 
can be understood as a potential sign of Islamic “identity affirmation” among the descendants of 
immigrants from the region (p.34). In terms of frequency of practice of religion, around 15 
percent of second-generation of Algerian descent in both 1992 and 2008 declared practicing 
frequently, while the proportion has fallen from around 20 percent to around 15 percent in the 
first-generation from 1992 to 2008 (p.13). What remains to be known is whether these trends can 
be generalized for the whole of the Muslim population (including those of third- or fourth- 
immigrant generation).   
Another analysis of shifts in religiosity among immigrant origin population (belonging to all 
religious denominations) in France is offered by Patrick Simon (one of the directors of the TeO 
2008 survey data) and Vincent Tiberj (2013). They write that the survey data itself concentrates 
on “elements revealing the beliefs and personal practices” of religion and that they cannot 
provide analysis of “differences in values based on religious affiliation” (emphasis is mine). 
They conclude that while religious transmission remains strong among immigrant-origin 
individuals in France, there is also a significant proportion of those who experience “religious 
reinforcement” (i.e. increase in religiosity of second-generation compared to their first-
 
generation. Yet, they caution that religious endogamy remains rather high among Muslims in France overall (around 
80 percent).   
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generation parents) (p.25). Yet, the proportion of those who undergo “religious reinforcement” is 
significantly smaller than the proportion of those who undergo “secularization” (i.e. decrease in 
religiosity compared to their parents). In addition, they reject the thesis of “radicalization” based 
on the analysis of the dataset (p.26) and conclude that (like in the case of Lagrange 2013): 
“[T]here is no [evidence of] generational rupture that signals a more intense relation to religion 
among the youth born in France, but rather [an evidence of] a more general affirmation of 
religion among immigrant populations since the 1980s, which is a part of a more global 
movement of the evolution of the function of religion in the Muslim countries” (Simon and Tiberj 
2013:27) 
Continuing on the question of religious identity, evidence about the existence of “practicing and 
believing Muslims”, “believing Muslims”, and individuals “of Muslim origins” as separate 
categories of self-identification appears in surveys of Muslim communities undertaken by IFOP 
between 1989 and 2011 (IFOP 2011).10 However, the IFOP report does not break the findings 
based on immigrant generation for us to know how self-identification differs by immigrant 
generation.  
Outside of the French context, the study of shifts in religiosity using quantitative studies is 
slightly more developed because of availability of better-quality data for multiple years. 
Quantitative studies related to religious generation gap between foreign-born Muslims and 
European-born Muslims of immigrant origin for other countries in Europe describe two trends 
 
10 For example, in 2011, those of Muslim origins who were surveyed categorized themselves as follows: 41 percent 
as “practicing and believing Muslims”, 34 percent as “believing Muslims”, and 22 percent as “of Muslim origins.” 
10 
 
overall: no change from first- to second-generation or a decrease in religiosity over immigrant 
generation.11   
Multiple studies have emerged from the study of Muslim religiosity in the Netherlands. Phalet 
and colleagues use data on the religiosity of Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch Muslims (for years 
1998, 2002, and 2005) in the Netherlands and conclude that “the second generation practices less 
and attaches less importance to religious schools than the first generation” (2008:431). Van de 
Pol and van Tubergen (2014) study trends in transmission of religiosity from first- to second-
generation of the same Muslim population. They conclude that while religious practices (like 
reading Quran, following halal dietary restrictions, or wearing headscarves) continues to have the 
same frequency from first- to second-generation in majority of the cases (between 60-90 
percent), “it is more often the case that people are less religious as opposed to more religious 
than their parents” (p.97). This conclusion is similar to that made by Simon and Tiberj (2013) in 
the French case.  
Another study, again in the case of Netherlands, seeks to understand the transmission of ethnic 
and religious identity from first- to second-generation and the shift in the relation between the 
two identities over generation. Like in the previously mentioned studies, they conclude that 
“second generation reports weaker ethnic and religious identities, and engages less in ethno-
cultural and religious practices.” For example, the percentage of first-generation immigrants of 
Turkish and Moroccan origins who do not call themselves Muslims is lower than that found 
among second generation (around 5 percent in first- to around 12 percent in second-generation) 
(Maliepaard, Lubbers, and Gijsberts 2010). In addition, the authors also argue that “the 
 
11 See Voas and Fleischmann’s (2012) paper “Islam Moves West: Religious Change in the First and Second 
Generations.” Annual review of Sociology 38(1): 525-545 for an excellent review on this topic. 
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differences in religious identity between the recent migrants and the second generation are due to 
the fact that the former are more attached to their ethnic group” and that “for the second 
generation, feeling Moroccan or Turkish plays a stronger role in maintaining a religious identity 
than it does for the first” (p.464). The high correlation between ethnic and religious identity 
among second-generation goes against the evidence of the de-linking of religious and ethnic 
identity among European-raised Muslims compared to first-generation that has been presented in 
multiple qualitative studies (that I outline later). 
Breaking from the trends of either decrease in or maintenance of first-generation religious 
practices evidenced in previous quantitative works, Maliepaard et al. (2012) show that there has 
been a recent rise (since 2004) in the frequency of mosque attendance among second-generation 
Muslims of Moroccan and Turkish origin in the Netherlands compared to the first-generation 
Muslims of their ethnic origin. It remains to be known if such increase is observable in other 
indicators of religious practice, religiosity, and religious identity. 
2.2 Evidence from Qualitative studies 
Some of the earliest studies that pointed to a difference between the religiosity of first-generation 
Muslims and their European-raised descendants were qualitative studies undertaken in the 
context of France. An interest in the study of the evolution of religiosity among immigrants and 
their descendants has been around since 1980s, when Muslims became more “visible” in the 
French public space.12 In a majority of these studies, starting with the works of Jocelyne Cesari 
(1997, 1998), Gilles Kepel (1991), Farhad Khosrokhavar (1997), Olivier Roy (1999), and Nancy 
 
12 This increased visibility has been attributed by many authors to the increase in media coverage of the “riots” in 
the French suburbs, where most of the immigrant families lived in public housing. The mediatization of the March 
of the Beurs, which took place in 1983 and comprised primarily of immigrant-origin youth marching to demand 
equality in the French society, has been pointed out as being of primary importance in contributing to this visibility. 
12 
 
Venel (1999) in the 1990s, a common argument has been that the religiosity of the first-
generation Muslims is different from that of French-raised Muslims. At the European level, an 
edited volume compiled by Steven Vertovec and Alisdair Rogers (1998) demonstrated similar 
trends in religious generational gap across multiple countries including Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 
Four key theories are found in the qualitative literature on shift in Muslim religiosity over 
immigrant generation: individualization of religion; de-ethnicization, deterritorialization, and 
deculturalization of religion; reislamization; and radicalization of religiosity among French- (or 
European-) raised Muslims compared to first-generation Muslim immigrants. These theories are 
proposed, in many cases, as interrelated with each other, as I outline below.  
One of the prominent theories in the qualitative literature on difference in religiosity between 
first-generation Muslims and French-raised Muslims is the idea that Islam in the later generation 
is more “individualized” compared to that found among the first-generation Muslims. Jocelyne 
Cesari, one of its key proponents, writes:  
“The European Muslims advance an individualized logic of decision-making and choice that fits 
well in the growing subjectification of religious affiliation (appartenance). It is not sufficient to 
believe and to practice because one is born into this or that belief tradition, rather [it is important] 
to express one’s individuality by making a choice of practicing [a religion] and to give a personal 
meaning to the revealed message” (Cesari 2002a:20).  
The importance of individualized choice in relation to religion, especially religious practices, 
among the French-raised Muslims has been described in qualitative literature since 1980s. For 
example, Yves Gonzalez de Quijano mentions an interview where a young 15 year-old boy of 
Moroccan origin describes that the French-raised Muslims are “lucky” to be in France because 
13 
 
“if we don’t want to do [Ramadan], we don’t do it”, unlike in “bled” (country of origin) where 
they would have social pressure to fast (Gonzales De Quijano 1987:824).  
This “chosen” Islamic identity, that Farhad Khosrokhavar (1997) terms as a “bricolage” of 
identity, is contrasted to the “inherited” Islam of the first-generation (also mentioned in Tietze 
2000:263). As Adis Duderija writes: 
“Islamic identity for many western-born/raised Muslims is based upon a conscious choice of 
religious identity reconstruction and not merely on the basis of reproduction of an inherited aspect 
of their ethnic heritage or tradition” (Duderija 2007:146). 
The importance of “choice” among the Western-raised Muslims compared to first-generation 
immigrants when talking about religion has also been pointed out in studies outside of France. 
For example, Garbi Schmidt’s (2004) work has shown the importance of “choice” and 
“rationality” among Muslim youth of immigrant origin in Denmark, Sweden, and the United 
States when talking about religious affiliation and adoption of religious practices. 
Developing on the concepts of agency in relation to religion, and placing it in the context of the 
shift in citizenship over generation, Caitlin Killian (2007:305) demonstrates that “while many 
immigrants affirm that Islam should be kept at home, in private, an increasing number of their 
children seek visible symbols of religious/ethnic identity, such as the headscarf, suggesting the 
emergence of generational differences in the experience of Islam in Europe.” Given that many 
French-raised Muslims have French citizenship (because of the jus-soli citizenship policy in 
France) and because many of them are socialized and educated in France, this generation feels 
more French compared to the earlier generation of Muslims (Maxwell and Bleich 2014) and 
seeks to assert their rights (like freedom of religious expression) in the French context.  
14 
 
At the same time, evidence about the younger generation showing more “visible symbols” 
relating to religious identity compared to the first-generation remains debated. Jean Beaman 
(2016) argues against Killian’s (2007) proposition to show that middle class second-generation 
Maghrebi Muslims don’t show religiosity in public and, instead, seek to maintain the secular 
norms of the French society by keeping religion in the private.13  
The desire to have agency in religious matters also manifests itself in terms of differences in 
sources used to gain information about religion among French-raised Muslims, as compared with 
first-generation immigrant Muslims. One of the most important contemporary sources of Islamic 
knowledge is the internet, which Olivier Roy calls the “virtual ummah” (Roy 2004:183).14 
Kaltenbach and Tribalat (2002) write that the internet becomes a handy tool for young French 
Muslims because it provides a great variety of sources on Islam and also allows them to 
communicate with other fellow Muslims in online forums. The difference between the two 
generations emerges because “the children of those ‘Muslims’ who came to work in France…are 
in search of information that their parents are frequently incapable of providing [because the 
first-generation] practice a popular Islam that they got to know in their country of origin” 
(p.269).  
 
13 In most studies on shifts in religiosity over immigrant generation, difference is made between individualization 
and privatization of religion. There is evidence of the former process taking place over immigrant generation (i.e. 
increase in importance of agency in relation to religious practices and construction of religious identity over 
generation); there is general agreement that religion among Muslims of first-generation is more “private” and 
“quiet” in that that demands for religious accommodation in public space are less present among the first-generation 
rather than among those who are born or raised in Europe.   
14 Ummah is an Arabic term that means ‘community.’ It has come to be used to refer to the Muslim community in a 
global context.  
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Another important source of Islamic knowledge that qualitative studies have identified among 
younger generations is the Quran and other holy texts. As Jørgen Nielsen writes: 
“[T]here is growing evidence that young people are meeting formally and informally in small 
groups on a regular basis to discuss the source texts. Qur’an and Hadith are explored as fresh 
texts, without the intervention of centuries of Islamic scholarship. In consequence, the texts are 
interpreted in the light of current needs and with methods which are based on the intellectual tools 
acquired through education in European schools” (Nielsen 2016:130). 
This reading of the holy texts by European-raised Muslims is contrasted with “traditional” ideas 
about Islam that first-generation parents have and which, the literature argues, are derived from 
religious authorities in their country of origin. Nielsen (2016) mentions the use of Islam as a 
form of legitimizing factor by first-generation parents to control the behavior (especially 
marriage and partner choice) of their European-raised children. At the same time, Islam is also 
used by the younger generation to legitimize their perceptions of gender roles, especially in the 
familial context; choices like shared domestic and childcare responsibilities, for example, are 
“explained as being legitimately Islamic, even as being more correct, in Islamic terms, than the 
practices of their parents” (Nielsen 2016:130).  
The presentation of “true Islam” as “gender equal” by European-raised Muslims is a trend 
observable in many countries in Europe. The younger generation, especially women, use this to 
challenge gender roles imposed upon them by their parents, as Dounia Bouzar (2003) has shown. 
Bouzar gives the example of Nouria, a second-generation Muslim of Turkish origin, who says: 
“When I found my religious sources and I could study them, I realized that Islam gave me rights 
that my father forbade me: [for example] studies [and] my consent to choose my husband who 
might not be Turkish” (cited in Bouzar 2003:47). 
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Developing on Bouzar’s work, Chantal Saint-Blancat writes that “the women use veil, that they 
might choose or refuse, as a symbol of quest for liberty and parity” (2004:241).  
Bouzar (2003) also mentions the trend of “de-ethnicization” of Islam among the younger 
generation of Muslims who make a “separation between their geographic origin and their 
religious belief” in order to break from the “Arab or French” dilemma, i.e. having to put two 
identities in opposition with each other and being forced to choose one over the other. This 
separation allows the younger generation to keep links with their ethnic community while also 
allowing them to live a fully French life (p.47). Instead of relying on ethnic identity, many 
French-raised Muslims come to rely on religion as a criterion for community building (termed as 
Ummah in Arabic). This tendency has been termed as “neo-communitarianism” (néo-
communautarisme) by Nancy Venel (2004). 
For Olivier Roy, de-ethnicization of Islam among the younger generation of immigrant origin is 
linked to “deculturalization” and “deterritorialization” of Islam away from the country of origin 
of their parents. This process generates for him a shift towards religion as “faith and authenticity, 
not academic knowledge or scholarly training,” and where boundaries of religiosity are marked 
by “signs of belonging (such as styles of clothing, wearing of hijab or growing a beard) and 
performative actions or declarations (such as dotting a speech with Arabic expressions)” 
(2004:166). 
While Jørgen Nielsen agrees about the importance of Arabic language among the European-
raised Muslims, he disagrees about religion not being about “academic knowledge.” He gives the 
example of a high proportion of British-born Muslims (of immigrant origin) enrolling in 
universities to get their degree in Arabic language (Nielsen 2016:130).  
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The idea of separating Muslim identity from ethnic identity (especially Arab identity) developed 
among the second-generation over time. The tendency to de-link “Arab” and “Muslim” identity 
was documented among young Muslims by Gonzales de Quijano (1987) and continues to be 
manifested at a higher rate today, according to the cases documented by the qualitative literature. 
For example, Nathalie Kakpo’s work demonstrates that sons of first-generation Maghrebi 
immigrants from a small city close to Geneva chose to dissolve the links between “naturalized 
genealogy” (being Maghrebi) and “symbolic genealogy” (Islam) because of the situation of 
marginalization that they faced in everyday life. She writes: 
“The [symbolic genealogy] is mobilized by the youth because the [naturalized genealogy] is 
“defective.” As a historical religion, Islam signifies permanence, power and greatness whereas 
naturalized linkages - embodied by the father or the land from which he came - is synonymous 
with domination and humiliation” (Kakpo 2005:152). 
De-ethnized Islam is also used by younger generation of Muslims, especially women, in order to 
contest arranged marriages with Muslims of the same ethnic group. As in the case of Nouria 
(quoted earlier) studies among Muslims raised in the United States have also demonstrated the 
presence of de-ethicized religiosity, especially in the instances of marriage and spouse selection 
(Grewal 2009).   
The separation of ethnic and religious identity over time developed in parallel with the separation 
between French-raised Muslims who simply believe and those who both believe in and practice 
Islam (Beaman 2016; Cesari 2002b). Nancy Venel (2004) identifies frequency of ritual prayer as 
the distinction made between practicing and believing Muslims, with the former group 
performing it with higher frequency than the latter group.  
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Gilles Kepel, writing about Islam in the French suburbs in 1991, pointed towards potential shifts 
taking place in mid-1980s in the religiosity of the French-raised children, in contrast to that of 
their parents. He writes that the youth of immigrant origin “were in a large majority distant from 
Islam and did not define themselves as Muslims in a spontaneous fashion, until the first signs of 
reislamization began to manifest itself in Parisian suburbs and especially in Lyonnais suburbs 
starting in 1985” (Kepel 1991:353). Olivier Roy, who agrees that there is a form of 
reislamization among Western-raised Muslims overall, defines it as such: “a way of 
appropriating [the process of acculturation], of experiencing it in terms of self-affirmation, but 
also of instrumentalizing it to ‘purify’ Islam” (2004:23).  
On the other hand, Vincent Geisser and Khadija Mohsen-Finan (2005) disagree with the 
proposition of “reislamization” of the youth and propose that the identity claims made by the 
younger generation should be seen plainly as “display Islam” (islam d’affichage) rather than 
representing a concrete experience.  
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Figure 1: HLM (Habitation à loyer modéré; low-income housing) buildings on the periphery 
between Paris and the suburbs. 
 
*Many of these were built to house immigrant-origin families and continue to contribute in urban 
segregation of immigrant-origin families from those without immigrant origins in France. All 
photos in this thesis were taken by the author. 
 
The idea that Islam is used for “self-affirmation” among French- (or European-) raised Muslims 
is not new. Jocelyne Cesari (1997) has pointed out that individualization of religion means 
increase in importance of “choice” in relation to religion among French-raised Muslims; this also 
results in a public affirmation of religious identity and desire for religious accommodations 
among these individuals. In contrast to the “individualized” religiosity of the French-raised 
Muslims, Cesari describes Islam as present among the first-generation immigrants as being 
“popular and quiet,” in that that the elements of religious practice and religious identity are 
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derived not out of choice but rather from a relation with others of the same religion and ethnic 
community (Cesari 1997; also noted in Lamchichi 1999:78). Among these first-generation 
Muslims, a desire for accommodation of religious practices and religious identity in France is 
comparatively absent (Cesari 1994). 
The “quiet” first-generation immigrants are contrasted with European-raised Muslims who claim 
religious identity in the public space. One of the popular methods of claiming religious identity 
in the public space is the use of haram-halal division to mark what is sacred or permissible in the 
society, and what is not. Using the case of Turkish-origin Muslims in Germany, Nikola Tietze 
stresses that plural Muslim identities develop among German-raised Turkish-origin Muslims 
because of the context specific to living in the diasporic community (2000). She points, among 
others, to the use of religion to order life in the “disorder of the [German] society” – clarity of 
“frontiers between haram and halal” provide ways of ordering the society to German-born 
Muslims (p.258).   
Elaborating on his ideas of “de-ethnicized” Islam, Olivier Roy argues that some Western-raised 
Muslims (second- or third-generation immigrants) have come to adopt what he calls “neo-
fundamentalism.” Neo-fundamentalism for Roy is a form of radicalization which is manifested 
as “support for Al Qaeda, but also a new sectarian communitarian discourse, advocating 
multiculturalism as a means of rejecting integration into Western society” (Roy 2004:2). 
The theory that Western-raised Muslims of immigrant origins are undergoing radicalization has 
been presented in multiple works. Robert Leiken’s book “Europe's Angry Muslims: The Revolt 
of The Second Generation” uses examples of acts of “jihadi” terrorism committed by Western-
raised Muslims to demonstrate widespread radicalization (Leiken 2011; see also Kepel 1997, 
2017). A popular term used in the literature to designate European-raised Muslims of immigrant 
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origin who commit acts of terrorism is “homegrown terrorists” (Kastoryano 2017). Basing his 
arguments on observations and interviews with radicalized men inside and outside of prison, 
Farhad Khosrokhavar argues that “the most formidable supporters of radicalization are not 
grandfathers or fathers but the sons,” and that these “generational differences” are found both 
inside and outside the prisons in France (2017:74). Kaltenbach and Tribalat (2002) argue that the 
increasing use of internet as a source of religious information among French-raised Muslims 
opens up the opportunity to be “seduced by radical discourses” (p.270). 
Figure 2: A Hammam (Turkish bath) located in north-eastern district of Paris. 
 
 
While religious radicalization and desire for “sacred violence” is one path adopted by Muslim 
youth of immigrant origin who face continuous marginalization in the French society, another 
path manifests itself in a form of “internal exile” where “subjects cut themselves off from society 
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by embracing forms of Islamic identity” like Salafism or membership of Tablighi Jamaat 
(Khosrokhavar 2017:94–96; see also Parvez 2017:Chapter 5-6). 
Adis Duderija writes that because of the “processes of immigration”, two types of Muslim 
identities have emerged among the Western-born descendants of Muslim immigrants: “Neo-
Traditional Salafis (NTS) and Progressive Muslims (PMs)” (2007:150). What he describes as the 
former is similar to the radicalized identities described earlier, while the latter group consists of 
those who “are observant Muslims [and] who view Western norms, popular culture, and 
lifestyles as mostly compatible with Islam. They do not see inherent conflict in their dual 
identities as Muslims and Europeans” (Mandaville 2002:220).  
One can see three main limitations to most qualitative evidence on religious generational gap: 
first, most of the theorization of this gap is built on interviews and observations with French- (or 
Western-) raised Muslims. First-generation Muslim immigrants are less well-represented in 
qualitative works, especially more recent works. Second, qualitative studies – including this one 
– are undertaken mostly in the context of urban spaces in either France or elsewhere in Europe. 
Hence, we do not have qualitative data about the difference in religiosity between first-
generation Muslims and French- (or European-) raised Muslims living in rural areas.  
Third, many qualitative works talk about concepts I described above – like individualization, de-
ethnicization, reislamization, or radicalization of Islam among French-raised Muslims compared 
to their first-generation counterparts. Yet, in much of the work, attempts to provide a list of 
observable religious differences that can be used to design quantitative surveys have not been 
made. One might explain this absence of observable outcomes of religiosity by the fact that 
many of these authors have argued that the presence of a uniform discourse (like 
individualization of Islam among the younger generation) allows for an inclusion of a plurality of 
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religious practices (Tietze 2002). For example, Chantal Saint-Blancat writes that “a demand for 
individualization of the interpretation of religious practice…leads in the long term to the 
inclusion of a pluralism of behavior within the community” (2004:241). Yet generational 
difference in variation of religious practice could itself potentially be analyzed with large-scale 
survey data. 
This paper takes it as its goal to bridge this gap between the findings of qualitative and 
quantitative studies of the religious generation gap. In the sections that follow, I highlight some 
observables or outcomes of religiosity using both secondary quantitative survey data and primary 






Section 3: Religious generational gap: Evidence from quantitative survey data 
In this section, I make use of data from three quantitative surveys: Pew Global Attitudes 
Survey (Pew 2006), Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO 2008), and French Institute of Public 
Opinion study of the Muslim population (IFOP 2019). The three surveys were selected because 
they contain a significantly sized sample of Muslims as well as measures for country of birth (in 
France versus in a foreign country) and religiosity.15 Here, I take foreign-born status to be 
synonymous with first-generation and French-born status to be synonymous with descendants of 
immigrants, given that a large majority of the Muslim population in France has immigrant 
origins.16 
The Pew Global Attitudes Survey oversampled Muslims in four European countries in 2006; in 
each of these four countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, and Spain), around 400 Muslims 
were surveyed. In the case of France, quota sampling design was used and adults aged 18 years 
or above were interviewed over phone. This means that the data is representative of telephone 
households. Of the total interviewed, half were foreign-born (200) and the other half were 
French-born (199).   
 
15 Recent waves of European Social Survey data for France have data on religious denomination as well as country 
of birth. Yet, the sample size of those who identify as Muslim in each wave (between 50-100 respondents) is too 
small for meaningful statistical analysis. 
16 The proportion of native converts to Islam in France remains low. According to an estimate in 2013, there were 
100,000 converts in a total Muslim population of six million, amounting to around 1.7 percent of the Muslim 
population. See https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/world/europe/rise-of-islamic-converts-challenges-france.html 
for more details (last accessed on 27 January 2020) 
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Trajectories and Origins (TeO) survey data was collected in 2008 by the National Institute of 
Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) and the National Institute for Demographic Studies 
(INED). Data was obtained in metropolitan France (excluding the overseas French departments 
and territories) between September 2008 and February 2009 through face-to-face interviews. 
TeO (2008) contains the largest sample of Muslims among all existing surveys and is 
representative for ages 18-50 years overall. I make use of data for 5,071 individuals who self-
identified as Muslim, out of a total of 21,761 respondents. As in the case of Pew survey data, I 
differentiate the generational groups based on country of birth (2,674 are foreign-born and 2,397 
are French-born). Both Pew (2006) and Teo (2008) survey datasets provide probability weights; 
they are used in the data analysis that I undertake in the rest of the paper. 
The French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP), a private survey institute in France, published a 
survey report in September 2019 measuring the opinion of the Muslim population in France on 
various subjects, most of which concern religiosity.17 A total of 1,012 of those having “Muslim 
religion or origin” were interviewed over phone in August and September 2019. Of these, 540 
are either foreigners or French nationals by acquisition (I categorize them as foreign-born or 
first-generation) and 472 are French by birth (I categorize them as French-born Muslims who are 
descendants of first-generation immigrants). The raw data for this survey is not made available 
publicly, hence I make use of the data from the published report to analyze differences in 
religiosity of both generational groups.  
 
17 The survey was undertaken to mark the 30th anniversary of the “Headscarf Affair” (1989) and produced for Le 
Point, a magazine, and Foundation Jean-Jaures. The report can be accessed at https://www.ifop.com/publication/les-
musulmans-en-france-30-ans-apres-laffaire-des-foulards-de-creil/ (last accessed: 26 January 2020) 
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I analyze differences in religiosity between the two generational groups for the three surveys in 
Table 3.1 (for Pew (2006) data), Table 3.2 (for TeO (2008) data), and Table 3.3 (for IFOP (2019) 
data). We see that religion remains important for Muslims of both generations in the two surveys 
that ask about importance of religion in life (Pew 2006, TeO 2008). Below I analyze key 
indicators measuring religiosity to understand trends in generational differences.  
3.1 Religious practices 
Visit to the mosques, especially for Friday prayers, remains an important sign of commitment to 
religion among Muslims around the world. Yet, more than half of the Muslim population in 
France does not “usually go to the mosques” for Friday prayers (IFOP 2019). Contrary to the 
popular discourse that the French-raised Muslims have a higher frequency of religious practices 
like mosque attendance, a higher proportion of first-generation immigrants “usually go to the 
mosques” for Friday prayers compared to the French-born Muslims (45 percent compared to 30 
percent; see IFOP 2019). We see a similar trend in frequency of mosque attendance or other 
religious services in TeO 2008 and no significant difference in Pew 2006. What remains to be 
known is whether there is a generational gap in frequency of prayers, given that prayers can be 
undertaken outside of the mosques.18  
 
18 Most of my interviewees who prayed indicated that they prayed in their homes in a majority of the cases. Men 
indicated that they tried to attend prayer services in the mosque on Fridays. Overall, men showed higher frequencies 
of mosque attendance than women.  
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Figure 3: A mosque located in northern suburbs of Paris. 
 
* Many of these mosques were built in recent years, some through funding from governments or 
institutions in Muslim-majority countries. 
In addition to regular prayers, fasting during the holy month of Ramadan is considered one of the 
five pillars of Muslim faith. A significantly higher proportion of first-generation Muslims (72 
percent) indicated that they fasted for the “entirety” of last Ramadan, as compared to the French-












Variable Foreign-born French-born Difference Sample size
1 Importance of religion in life 399
Very important 0.60 0.55 0.05
Somewhat important 0.29 0.37 -0.08
Not too important 0.05 0.05 0
Not at all important 0.06 0.02 0.04
2 Do you generally cover your head while going out? How frequently? (women only) 204
Everyday 0.20 0.08 0.12
Almost everyday 0.03 0.02 0.01
Once or twice a week 0.03 0.02 0.01
A few times 0.07 0.10 -0.03
Never 0.67 0.78 -0.11
3 On average, how often do you attend the mosque for salah or Juma'ah prayer? 397
More than once a week 0.05 0.04 0.01
Once a week for Juma'ah 0.20 0.14 0.06
Once or twice a month 0.06 0.04 0.02
A few times a year 0.13 0.23 -0.10
Seldom 0.11 0.10 0.01
Never 0.45 0.45 0.00
4 Please tell me which one of these you trust the most to offer you guidance as a Muslim. 397
your local Imam or sheikh 0.21 0.31 -0.1***
National religious leaders 0.19 0.16 0.03
Religious leaders on television 0.10 0.02 0.08
Imams and institutions outside your country (such as al-
Azhar or the Saudi Imams of Mecca and Medina) 0.26 0.38 -0.12
None of the above 0.25 0.13 0.12
Pew (2006) survey containing data on 200 foreign-born and 199 French-born Muslims
Note: The significance for difference between religiosity outcomes for first-generation and that of French-born Muslims 
is indicated as follows: *** indicated p < 0.01; ** indicated p < 0.05, and * indicated p < 0.1. 
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Variable Foreign-born French-born Difference Sample size
5
Overall, do you think that the quality of life for Muslim 
women in France is better, worse, or about the same as 
the quality of life for women in most Muslim countries?
398
Better 0.57 0.68 -0.11***
Worse 0.24 0.08 0.16
About the same 0.19 0.24 -0.05
6
Please tell me how worried you are about each the 
following issues related to Muslims living in France: 
Muslim women in France taking on modern roles in 
society
390
Very worried 0.15 0.18 -0.03
Somewhat worried 0.35 0.27 0.08
Not too worried 0.17 0.19 -0.02
Not at all worried 0.33 0.37 -0.04
7
Please tell me how worried you are about each the 
following issues related to Muslims living in France: The 
influence of music, movies, and television on Muslim 
youth in France
399
Very worried 0.19 0.14 0.05**
Somewhat worried 0.30 0.19 0.11
Not too worried 0.19 0.25 -0.06
Not at all worried 0.32 0.41 -0.09
8
Please tell me how worried you are about each the 
following issues related to Muslims living in France: A 
decline in the importance of religion among France's 
Muslims
398
Very worried 0.22 0.2 0.02
Somewhat worried 0.39 0.33 0.06
Not too worried 0.17 0.24 -0.07
Not at all worried 0.23 0.24 -0.01
Pew (2006) survey containing data on 200 foreign-born and 199 French-born Muslims
Note: The significance for difference between religiosity outcomes for first-generation and that of French-born Muslims 
is indicated as follows: *** indicated p < 0.01; ** indicated p < 0.05, and * indicated p < 0.1. 
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Table 3.1: continued 
 
 
Consumption of halal diet is another important marker of religiosity among many Muslims, 
especially in France, given the importance of consumption of alcohol and pork as indicative of 
Frenchness in the popular discourse. Halal diet consists of prohibition in consumption of alcohol 
and pork; in addition, only meats obtained from animals killed in a prescribed manner are 
considered “halal” (which means ‘permissible’ in Arabic). In terms of consumption of halal diet, 
French-born Muslims show a significantly higher frequency of respecting food prohibitions 
Variable Foreign-born French-born Difference Sample size
9
Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms 
of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to 
defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, 
no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never 
justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence 
is...
395
Often justified 0.05 0.08 -0.03
Sometimes justified 0.08 0.13 -0.05
Rarely justified 0.20 0.18 0.02
Never justified 0.67 0.61 0.06
10
Do you think there is a struggle in France between 
moderate Muslims and Islamic fundamentalists or don’t 
you think so?
395
Yes 0.57 0.57 0
11 Which side do you identify with more in this struggle, moderate Muslims or Islamic fundamentalists? 217
Moderate Islam 0.88 0.92 -0.04
Islamic fundamentalism 0.12 0.08 0.04
12
Do you think there is a natural conflict between being a 
devout Muslim and living in a modern society, or don’t 
you think so?
398
Yes, there is a conflict 0.35 0.21 0.14***
No, there is not a conflict 0.65 0.79 -0.14
Pew (2006) survey containing data on 200 foreign-born and 199 French-born Muslims
Note: The significance for difference between religiosity outcomes for first-generation and that of French-born Muslims 
is indicated as follows: *** indicated p < 0.01; ** indicated p < 0.05, and * indicated p < 0.1. 
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compared to the foreign-born Muslims; 86 percent of French-born Muslims indicated “always” 
consuming halal food compared to 83 percent of foreign-born Muslim (TeO 2008). In addition, 
the difference in frequency at which French-born Muslims buy halal meat compared to foreign-
born Muslims is statistically higher, yet not large (IFOP 2019). There is no significant difference 
by generation in response to frequency at which Muslims “look at the composition of [food 
items] to assure that they do not contain non-halal ingredients like gelatin, alcohol, or pork” 
(IFOP 2019).  
Consumption of alcohol is also considered haram, or not permissible, by many Muslims. About 
20 percent of both generational groups indicate that they consumed alcohol sometimes, and there 
is no generational difference in that respect (IFOP 2019).  
3.2 Markers of religiosity 
One of the popular discourses in France suggests that the French-born Muslims use religious 
markers, especially in the form of clothing, more frequently than the first-generation immigrant 
Muslims. This is especially true for discourses related to wearing of hijab among women.  
TeO (2008) allows us to understand trends in usage of different types of markers of religiosity. 
Overall, the frequency at which religious signs (of any type) are used is similar in both the 
generations. What we see is differences in the type of religious signs preferred by those of 
different generations. French-born Muslims have a preference for religious jewelry while first-










Variable Foreign-born French-born Difference Sample size
1
What importance did religion have in the 
upbringing you received from your family? 
(r_impedu)
5045
Not important at all 0.06 0.10 -0.04***
Moderately important 0.15 0.18 -0.03
Important 0.28 0.29 -0.01
Very important 0.52 0.43 0.09
2 What importance does religion have in your life? (r_impvie) 5046
Not important at all 0.05 0.02 0.03***
Moderately important 0.18 0.18 0
Important 0.28 0.31 -0.03
Very important 0.49 0.49 0
3 Do you attend religious services...? (r_culte) 5044
At least once a week 0.12 0.09 0.03***
Once or twice a month 0.07 0.07 0
For religious events 0.20 0.28 -0.08
Only for family events like births, marriages or 
funerals 0.23 0.25 -0.02
Never 0.39 0.31 0.08
4 In your daily life, do you respect your religion’s food prohibitions? (r_miam) 5057
Always 0.83 0.86 -0.03***
Sometimes 0.08 0.1 -0.02
Never 0.09 0.04 0.05
There are none 0 0 0
5 Are you a member of a religious association (i_assrel) 5069
Yes 0.02 0.02 0
TeO (2008) survey containing data on 2,674 foreign-born and 2,397 French-born Muslims
Note: The significance for difference between religiosity outcomes for first-generation and that of French-born 
Muslims is indicated as follows: *** indicated p < 0.01; ** indicated p < 0.05, and * indicated p < 0.1. 
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Table 3.2: continued  
 
 
Variable Foreign-born French-born Difference Sample size
6 In everyday life, do you wear clothing or jewelry in public that evokes your religion? (r_ostent) 4957
Always 0.13 0.14 -0.01*
Sometimes 0.07 0.10 -0.03
Never 0.80 0.76 0.04
7 Which kind? (multiple options allowed) 5071
Jewels 0.04 0.15 -0.11***
Clothing 0.04 0.03 0.01
Headcover 0.13 0.06 0.07***
Other signs 0.00 0.01 -0.01*
Use of at least one sign 0.19 0.24 -0.05*
8 Which kind? (multiple options allowed; women only) 2709
Jewels 0.07 0.22 -0.15***
Clothing 0.03 0.02 0.01
Headcover 0.24 0.12 0.12***
Other signs 0.00 0.00 0
Use of at least one sign 0.32 0.35 -0.03
9 Language of reference (lref_gr) 5071
Arabic and related dialects (not Berber) 0.56 0.57 -0.01***
10 What is your level in Arabic (if Arabic is reference language) (l_nivlr) 2316
Understand a few words 0.01 0.04 -0.03***
Understand well but you have trouble speaking 0.04 0.19 -0.15
Understand and speak easily but without reading 
or writing 0.25 0.58 -0.33
Fluent (speak, read and write) 0.71 0.19 0.52
11 In France, have you taken lessons in Arabic in France (if Arabic reference language) (l_courlr) 2317
Yes 0.08 0.35 -0.27***
12 Would you like to be buried in...? (r_tombe) 4358
Wishes to be buried outside of France 0.57 0.45 0.12***
TeO (2008) survey containing data on 2,674 foreign-born and 2,397 French-born Muslims
Note: The significance for difference between religiosity outcomes for first-generation and that of French-born 
Muslims is indicated as follows: *** indicated p < 0.01; ** indicated p < 0.05, and * indicated p < 0.1. 
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Since the “Headscarf Affair” in 1989, which was started by a heavily mediatized controversy 
over the suspension of three female students from their middle school because of their hijab, all 
forms of headscarves have become a common aspect of media coverage in France. One 
discourse that has been popularized and that was used to support the banning of hijab from the 
French public schools starting 2004 is that hijabs were a sign of increasing “radicalization” 
among French-born Muslim girls. By contrast, analysis of survey data shows that less than a 
quarter of all Muslim women wear a hijab (Pew 2006, TeO 2008, IFOP 2019). All three surveys 
indicate that first-generation women are more likely to wear a hijab than French-born Muslim 
women (around a quarter among first-generation women wear a hijab while between 10-15 
percent of French-born Muslim women wear a hijab according to the three surveys).  
3.3 Source of Islamic knowledge 
Arabic language has a high importance among Muslims around the world because the Quran, the 
holy text revealed to the Prophet Mohammad, is written in Arabic and is considered the 
foundation of Islamic knowledge. In addition, knowledge of Arabic is important because many 
Muslims in France have origins in Arabic-speaking countries. Yet, most countries use an Arabic 
dialect that is different from Quranic Arabic. 
35 
 
Figure 4: A street corner in Barbès, in the northern part of Paris.
 
* Barbès is filled with commerce catering to immigrant-origin families from North Africa. 
 
Around 57 percent of the Muslim population, according to TeO (2008) data, calls Arabic or 
related dialect their “language of reference” (in addition to French in some cases). There is no 
significant generational difference in the proportion of those who call Arabic their reference 
language. Yet, first-generation respondents report a higher level of fluency compared to the 
French raised Muslims (71 percent compared to 19 percent; see TeO 2008). At the same time, a 
higher proportion of French-raised Muslims with Arabic as reference language report attending 
Arabic language courses in France (35 percent compared to 8 percent among the first-generation; 
see TeO 2008). What remains unknown is whether higher rate of fluency in Arabic among the 
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first-generation indicates knowledge of standard Arabic language (or Quranic Arabic) and 
whether the courses in Arabic language teach Quranic Arabic or one of the Arabic dialects. 
Scholars like Olivier Roy (2004) have talked about the increasing use of internet as a source of 
Islamic knowledge among the younger generation, especially in the case of French-born 
Muslims. What quantitative evidence do we have about this difference? There is a significant 
difference in both the generations in terms of sources they prefer to get knowledge about Islam. 
When asked to indicate “which [authority] you trust the most to offer you guidance as a 
Muslim,” French-born Muslims showed a higher preference for a “local Imam or Sheikh” who is 
based in France (31 percent compared to 21 percent among foreign-born) but at the same time, 
they also showed a higher preference for knowledge derived from “Imams and institutions 
outside your country (such as al-Azhar or the Saudi Imams of Mecca and Medina)” (38 percent 
compared to 26 percent; see Pew 2006).19 We do not know what proportion of those who consult 
authorities outside of France consult with those who are based in their country of origin. We also 
do not know if the choice of the source is based on shared ethnicity of the imams (like Arab or 
Sub-Saharan African, for example).  
Religious associations are also indicated as important source of Islamic knowledge for French-
raised Muslims (Nielsen 2016:13–14), yet we see that both generations of Muslims show 
negligible participation in religious associations (about 2 percent in both generational groups; 
TeO 2008).  
  
 
19 The choices offered by the survey question included “Local imam or sheikh,” “national religious leaders,” 








Variable Foreign-born French-born Difference Sample size
1 Do you usually go to the mosque on Fridays? 1012
Yes 0.45 0.30 0.15***
2 During the last Ramadan, did you…? 1012
fast during entirety 0.72 0.60 0.12**
fast some days 0.09 0.14 -0.05
not fasted 0.19 0.25 -0.06
3 Do you sometimes drink alcohol? 1012
Yes 0.20 0.23 -0.03
4 The frequency at which you buy halal meat 1012
systematically 0.55 0.58 -0.03***
most of the time 0.17 0.12 0.05
time to time 0.13 0.12 0.01
rarely 0.06 0.05 0.01
never 0.07 0.09 -0.02
doesn't buy meat 0.02 0.03 -0.01
5
When you buy food items, do you look at the 
composition of it to assure that it does not contain 
non halal ingredients like gelatin, alcohol, or pork?
1012
systematically 0.47 0.5 -0.03
most of the time 0.19 0.17 0.02
time to time 0.11 0.13 -0.02
rarely 0.06 0.06 0
never 0.17 0.14 0.03
6
Outside of the meat, do you buy…? (multiple 
options possible; proportion represents those who 
said "yes")
1012
Oriental or traditional Maghrebi food items 0.68 0.7 -0.02
Desserts, chocolates, sweets that are halal 0.58 0.55 0.03
Pre-cooked meals (fresh, conserved, frozen) that 
are halal 0.52 0.42 0.1***
IFOP (2019) survey containing data on 540 foreign-born and 472 French-born Muslims
Note: The significance for difference between religiosity outcomes for first-generation and that of French-born Muslims is 
indicated as follows: *** indicated p < 0.01; ** indicated p < 0.05, and * indicated p < 0.1. 
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Table 3.3: continued  
 
 
Variable Foreign-born French-born Difference Sample size
7 Do you wear the veil, whether it's the hijab or the niqab? (frequency of wearing of veil) 1012
yes, always 0.24 0.14 0.1***
yes, except at work 0.03 0.07 -0.04
yes, but rarely 0.1 0.05 0.05
no, but used to before 0.12 0.08 0.04
no, and have never worn 0.51 0.65 -0.14
8 Would you say that the law banning "integral veil" (niqab) on the streets and in other public spaces is…? 1012
mostly a good thing 0.32 0.31 0.01*
mostly a bad thing 0.56 0.62 -0.06
9 Which of the two options do you feel closest to? 1012
The practice of Islam must be adapted and fitted on 
certain points to be in conformity with French secularism 0.43 0.39 0.04
The French secularism must be adapted and fitted on 
certain points to be compatible with the practice of Islam 0.35 0.38 -0.03
none of the two 0.2 0.19 0.01
10
Here is a list of sentences. For each of them, can you tell 
me if you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or 
totally disagree (related to adherence to various statements 
on political, economic and societal issues; proportion 
represents those who "agreed")
1012
Secularism allows Muslims to freely practice their 
religion 0.76 0.64 0.12***
The homosexuals should be free to live their life as they 
wish 0.62 0.73 -0.11***
In France, Islamic law, sharia, should prevail over the 
laws of the Republic 0.36 0.18 0.18***
11
I am going to read you a list of affirmations. For each of 
them, can you tell me if you agree? (related to adherence to 
various claims about Islam in France; proportion represents 
those who "agreed")
1012
Children should be able to eat halal in school canteens 0.82 0.82 0
Girls should have the right to wear the veil in middle and 
high school 0.68 0.69 -0.01
We should be able to assert our religious identity
at work 0.56 0.52 0.04
The employer must adapt to the religious obligations of 
their employees 0.51 0.46 0.05
IFOP (2019) survey containing data on 540 foreign-born and 472 French-born Muslims
Note: The significance for difference between religiosity outcomes for first-generation and that of French-born Muslims is 
indicated as follows: *** indicated p < 0.01; ** indicated p < 0.05, and * indicated p < 0.1. 
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3.4 Islam and gender 
Integration into the French society would imply adoption of values about gender equality over 
immigrant generation. On the other hand, popular discourse, especially around wearing of hijab 
among French-raised Muslims, describes the Muslims in France as “radicalizing” and potentially 
undergoing a “regression” in terms of freedom for women (Marine Le Pen’s words).20 The idea 
that is put forward in these discourses is that Muslims overall want to maintain “traditional” 
gender roles rather than adopt French ideas of gender roles (assumed to be more egalitarian). 
Yet, we see that a higher proportion of French-born Muslims find that the “quality of life for 
Muslim women in France is better than the quality of life for women in most Muslim countries” 
(68 percent compared to 57 percent among foreign-born Muslims) (Pew 2006). 
In addition, a significantly higher proportion of French-born Muslims agree that “the 
homosexuals should be free to live their life as they wish” (73 percent compared to 62 percent 
among foreign-born Muslims) (IFOP 2019).  
There is no generational difference in response to whether those interviewed are worried or not 
about “Muslim women in France taking on modern roles in society” (Pew 2006). In both groups, 
around half are “worried” and the other half are “not worried.”  
3.5 Dividing the sacred from the profane  
Pew (2006) asked Muslims in France: “Do you think there is a natural conflict between being a 
devout Muslim and living in a modern society, or don’t you think so?” The popular discourse 
(where more French-raised Muslims are described as radicalizing than the first-generation) 
 
20 Duchemin, Remi. 2019. “Marine Le Pen : "Le voile n’est pas un bout de tissu anodin, c’est un marqueur de 
radicalité"” Europe1. https://www.europe1.fr/politique/marine-le-pen-le-voile-nest-pas-un-bout-de-tissu-anodin-
cest-un-marqueur-de-radicalite-3925985 (last accessed on 9 February 2020). 
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would dictate that more French-raised Muslims agree to the existence of the conflict. Rather, we 
find that a majority of Muslims disagree and that a significantly higher proportion of French-
born Muslims than foreign-born Muslims disagree (79 percent compared to 65 percent) (Pew 
2006).  
Many Muslims and non-Muslims in France attribute the so-called increase in radicalization 
among the “youth” to media influence. We see a significant difference between the two 
generations in response to whether individuals are worried about the “influence of music, 
movies, and television on Muslim youth in France” – a higher proportion of foreign-born are 
worried compared to the French-born (around half of the formed compared to about a third of the 
latter group) (Pew 2006).  
Pew (2006) asked Muslims three questions than can be used to see if there is a rise of 
fundamentalism and radicalized behavior. We see no significant differences between the two 
generations in responses to these questions. A majority of the Muslims do not think that “suicide 
bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam 
from its enemies” (between 80-90 percent). A majority of the Muslims also identify with 
“moderate Islam” compared to “Islamic fundamentalism” (around 90 percent).  
Demand for bringing “Sharia” (or Islamic law) to France is also seen as a sign of radicalization. 
A majority do not want Sharia to “prevail over the laws of the Republic.” A significantly lower 
proportion of French-born Muslims want Sharia compared to foreign-born Muslims (18 percent 
compared to 36 percent) (IFOP 2019).  
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3.6 Claiming Islamic identity 
Popular discourse has presented French-born Muslims as placing higher importance on Islam as 
an identity compared to first-generation immigrants. One discourse that has been proposed is that 
French-born Muslims ask for more accommodations of their religious practices compared to the 
foreign-born Muslims. IFOP (2019) survey asked a set of opinion questions to measure opinions 
on religious accommodations at school, at work, and in the French society overall.  
While a majority of Muslims agree about desirability of making religious accommodations at 
schools (allowing wearing of headscarf, and provision of halal food in school canteens), there is 
no significant generational gap (IFOP 2019). Around half of the Muslims in both generational 
groups agree to accommodations at workplace (agreement with “We should be able to assert our 
religious identity” and “The employer must adapt to the religious obligations of their 
employees”). These work-related accommodations form a part of highly-publicized debates in 
France, especially on topics like allowing wearing of headscarves, having prayer spaces, and 
accommodating work hours during Ramadan. Yet, there is no significant generational difference 
in opinions about these accommodations.  
A slightly higher proportion of French-raised Muslims think that “the law banning the ‘integral 
veil’ (niqab) on the streets and in other public spaces” is “mostly a bad thing” (62 percent 
compared with 56 percent). The differences are not very significant (IFOP 2019). 
In France, Islam gets talked about in contrast to secularism in the media as well as in the public 
discourse. Two questions related to secularism in France were asked in the IFOP survey. One 
question related to accommodations in France asks whether “French secularism must be adapted 
and fitted on certain points to be compatible with the practice of Islam” or vice versa. No clear 
trend emerges from the responses, and we observe no generational differences. Yet, in the 
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question that asks opinion on whether “secularism allows Muslims to freely practice their 
religion,” a significantly higher proportion of foreign-born Muslims agree that it does allow this 
freedom (76 percent compared to 64 percent among French-born) (IFOP 2019).  
In addition, choosing the site of burial is also a question that links religion and desires for 
accommodation in France. Overall, around half of the Muslim population in France wishes to be 
buried outside of France (the survey does not specify whether they want to be buried in the 
country of origin or elsewhere; see TeO 2008). A significantly higher proportion of foreign-born 
Muslims wish to be buried in France compared to French-born Muslims (57 percent compared to 
45 percent; see TeO 2008). 
In sum, these surveys find no consistent evidence of generational differences among Muslims in 
France. On many survey items, immigrant and French-born Muslims are indistinguishable; on 
some items, immigrants appear to be more religious than Muslims born in France, while on 






Section 4: Qualitative Evidence of Religious Generational Gap from the Field 
What accounts for the contrast between qualitative studies, which emphasize religious 
generational difference, and quantitative studies that find little generational difference? 
This section identifies five key themes that emerge in conversations with Muslims in France on 
the religious generational gap. These themes are linked to a set of observable outcomes that 
indicate differences in religiosity between the two immigrant generational groups. Among those 
interviewed are individuals who are either practicing Muslims or ‘cultural’ Muslims.21 I 
conducted a total of 25 semi-structured interviews with Muslims in the Greater Paris region over 
a total of six months (May-July 2018 and February-April 2019).22  
Among the 25 individuals I interviewed, 15 are women and 10 are men; 13 are first-generation 
immigrants and 12 are French-raised descendants of immigrants (8 are second-generation and 4 
are third-generation).23 The average age of my interviewees at the time of the interview was 
around 40 years. French-raised Muslims I interviewed were younger on average (around 34 years 
of age) than the first-generation immigrants I interviewed (around 45 years of age). My 
 
21 In order to have a more nuanced picture of narratives of religious generational gap, I interviewed individuals who 
identify as Muslims (those who believe in and practice their religion) as well as those who are ‘cultural’ Muslims in 
the sense that they were exposed to Islam in their childhood through family but who do not identify as Muslims. I 
refer to them all, as a group, as ‘Muslims’ in the context of this paper.  
22 See Appendix A for the questionnaire. 
23 Of the 8 second-generation immigrants, two of my interviewees arrived in France at age three and one arrived at 
age seven. They are included in the sample of second-generation immigrants because they went to school in France 
and underwent a religious socialization similar to other French-born Muslims. 
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interviewees varied in terms of demographic characteristics like country of origin, socio-
economic class, level of education, and occupation at the time of the interview.  
The Greater Paris region was chosen because it has the highest proportion of Muslims in France; 
about 40 percent of the total immigrant-origin Muslim population in France lives in this region.24 
Individuals were contacted through religious associations or made acquaintance with at mosques 
or immigrant-majority spaces where I also collected observation data. Given that I relied on 
snowball sampling for a part of the sample, the final set of cases should not be considered 
random or statistically representative. In addition to the interviews, observations at mosques and 
immigrant-majority spaces allowed me to witness discussions that brought to light the popularity 
of conversations on religious generational gap.25  
 
24 This is based on the analysis of TeO (2008) survey data – around 41% of first-generation Muslims and 36% of 
French-born Muslims of ages 18-50 years lived in the Greater Paris area in 2008.  
25 Given that these conversations were not recorded (in the light of the impromptu nature of many events that I 
would stumble upon), the quotes gathered from these conversations as well as from interviews not recoded on audio-
recorder do not represent the exact wordings of my interlocutors. I traded exactness of words for access to 
spontaneous events; these events have significantly added to the data available for this project. 
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Figure 5: A store catering to local Sub-Saharan African origin Muslims in Goutte d’Or 
area in northern part of Paris.
 
 
A majority of Muslims of immigrant origin with whom I interacted during my fieldwork agreed 
that a general religious generational gap exists between first-generation immigrants and French-
raised Muslims.26 French-raised Muslims commented on the gulf between their religiosity and 
that of first-generation immigrants (especially first-generation parents). At the same time, first-
generation immigrants felt that there was a significant difference between their own religiosity 
and that of those belonging to the generation of their children or grandchildren. Many of them 
 
26 Two interviewees, whose cases are not examined here, did not agree that there was a difference between 
religiosity of first-generation and French-raised Muslims. They include Karim and Hilal, both first-generation of 
Tunisian origin. I believe that two factors may be contributing to their opinion: first, that they had both arrived in 
France very recently, and second, that they did not have family or children in France in order to experience the kind 
of tensions that my other interlocutors mentioned when talking about generational gap. 
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cited examples from their own families, talking about the relation they have with their parents 
and/or children and sharing details about their own religiosity in comparison to that of members 
of the other generational group. Many brought up religious generational differences without me 
prompting them. 
When asked about differences in religiosity, my interviewees understood the term in different 
ways, including religious practices, religious belief (especially the authenticity of it), religious 
identity, as well as values derived from religion. The vagueness of the term “religiosity” might 
explain the results of a survey question in IFOP (2019) that asked Muslim women and men of 
age 50 years and above if they thought that the religiosity of the younger generation was 
different from their religiosity (and which I referred to in the introduction).27 As I show below, 
my interviewees indicated that different aspects of religiosity show different trends in both 
generations. I observed five themes across my interviewees’ observations about generational 
difference in religiosity:  
1. Choice versus inheritance of Islam 
2. Islamic epistemologies 
3. Religious attitudes towards gender and ethnic differences 
4. Dividing the sacred from the profane 
5. Claiming Islamic identity 
 
27 Muslim women and men of age 50 years and above were asked if they would “say that in your family, your 
entourage or your neighborhood, the young Muslims you know are today more religious, less religious or neither 
more nor less religious than your generation was at the same age?” Around half of them agreed that there was a 
religious gap, 40 percent said that there was no difference, and around 9 percent did not respond. Of those who 
agreed, 55 percent said that the younger generation was “more religious” and 45 percent said that the younger 
generation was “less religious.” 
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4.1 Choice versus inheritance of Islam 
When asked about how they came to wear religious clothing or started to pray, many of my 
French-raised Muslim interviewees described to me their relationship with Islam; they stressed 
that they had come to Muslim faith and related practices out of their own “choice” during 
adolescence. Many contrasted this with the process through which their first-generation parents 
had become Muslim – they talked about religion among first-generation immigrants being 
“inherited” from their family members back in the country of origin.  
When talking about her religious trajectory, Fareeda (second-generation of Pakistani origins) 
said: 
“I am the only one in my family who wears [a hijab]. My father did not want me to wear it…I 
wore it against his advice…I am a typical example [of someone belonging to second generation 
who wears a hijab]. I was never forced by my father to wear the hijab, nor by my mother or my 
brothers. My sisters don’t wear it, my mother doesn’t wear it at all.” 
French-raised Muslims contrasted their choice to wear religious clothing with religious clothing 
of first-generation Muslims that was described as “inherited,” “traditional and not religious,” or 
“forced.” Asma (third-generation of Moroccan origin) contrasted her “choice” of wearing a hijab 
during adolescence with the hijab that her mother and women in her maternal family wear: 
“In my family the hijab is more tradition than religion. We cover hair because of the tradition 
more than religion. Because in the Berber tradition, you don't show your hair to men. They do 
this because in Morocco the women worked outside in the farms. [This] tradition was there before 
religion. Because people, they don't read, they don't write, they don't go to school, [so] they know 
more tradition than religion. That is why they confuse between them!”  
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Sophie (third-generation of Algerian origins), who does not practice Islam but is “sensitive” to it, 
told me that she was “against everything that is forced,” and that for her, “the women who wear 
headscarf here [in France] and the women in Saudi Arabia [who wear headscarf] have no link 
between them.” The difference between them, she said, was French Muslim women’s freedom to 
choose to wear the headscarf. 
French-born interviewees also noted generational differences in the style of religious clothing, 
which they attributed to their freedom to choose. French-raised hijabi women expressed pride in 
their “chosen” clothing styles and in the variety of styles from which they could choose, as 
opposed to the “inherited” styles of first-generation women.  
While French-raised Muslims believe in the importance of “choice” in relation to religious belief 
and practices, first-generation Muslims did not agree. For example, Sami (first-generation of 
Algerian origin) rejected this idea of “choice”:  
“The young folks, they say stupid things. I do not believe when they say, ‘Oh I am not a Muslim.’ 
When one is born a Muslim, one stays a Muslim. One might [deviate from religious norms like] 
drink alcohol, go out with women [outside of marriage], or not wear a headscarf. But we stay 
Muslim.” 
While many French-raised women proudly talked about their “chosen” hijab and its “chosen” 
style, many first-generation and some French-raised Muslims commented that this “chosen” 
hijab was not in compliance with the more “modest and traditional” method of wearing hijab. 
Overall, there was a difference in what the first generation considered clothing that was modest 




At a Friday afternoon women’s Quran reading class that I attended at the Sociocultural Institute 
mosque in north of Paris, our teacher Aïcha, a second-generation woman of North African 
origin, commented on the lack of modesty in the clothes that younger generation hijabi women 
chose to wear (from fieldnotes, April 2019). She talked about the importance of wearing one’s 
hijab loose and one’s blouse and skirt loose, not tight, so that it “hides all the shapes.” The 
mostly first-generation crowd in the class giggled over the conversation, with many making 
jokes about the “bling-bling hijabs” they had seen among the younger generation that didn’t 
entirely cover the women’s face and neck (to their satisfaction), or the “tight dresses” they saw 
among younger hijabi women. All these they considered “haram” or not religiously permissible. 
Many of my first-generation interviewees commented that the younger generation’s choices of 
clothing were a result of their “bad comprehension” of Islam, which meant that “appearances” 
were given more importance rather than “good behavior” (bon comportement) towards others in 
the Muslim community (Cheikh Hamza and Houda). Many mentioned that the French-raised 
Muslims had “too much freedom without the supervision of first-generation parents” who were 
sometimes working multiple jobs to provide for their families (Hakim, first-generation of 
Algerian origin) and that they were becoming corrupt (Fatima, first-generation of Moroccan 
origin). Hakim had chosen to not bring his family to France because of the overwhelming 
presence of “delinquency” like “high consumption of drugs and alcohol” among French-raised 
children of his first-generation Muslim colleagues. In France, he was “scared that my children 
would lose their faith (iman).” 
Others, like Fedi (first-generation of Algerian origin), reclaimed the “inherited” aspect of their 
religiosity and described it as what made religiosity of first-generation Muslims as well as those 
in the country of origin more “authentic.” Fedi was proud of the genealogy through which he had 
50 
 
inherited his affiliation to Islam (that was rooted in his village in Algeria) and contrasted it with 
the “lack of” religious learning environment like the kind that French-raised Muslims had 
experienced. He saw Islam of his parents and grandparents in Algeria as being “solid” compared 
to his own as well as compared to what he saw among the French-raised Muslims of his age. He 
talked about how his great-grandfather had been a chief of a local Muslim brotherhood 
(mazawiya) and spoke with nostalgia about the “inherited” ways of learning and teaching Islam 
that existed in his family and in his community back in Algeria and which were passed on from 
one generation to another. He concluded: “our generation of Facebook, of social media, of Star 
Academy, of globalization, of torn jeans, I don’t think [that we have a solid religion].” 
4.2 Islamic epistemologies 
Houda (first-generation of Moroccan origin) and I met at the Grand Mosque in Paris, a space 
dominated by others of first-generation like her. Houda was working part-time as a teacher in 
primary school when I met her; her work arrangement allowed her to be present at the mosque 
for the Friday afternoon prayers. 
Houda didn’t wear a hijab outside of the mosque. Dressed modestly in a loose long shirt and 
pants, she told me about the differences between the Islamic knowledge that she acquired in 
Morocco and that acquired by French-raised Muslims: 
“The Islam that the Muslims born here in France, [the Islam] they know, it isn’t at all what we 
learnt back in our home in Morocco. I see these young French women who wear headscarves and 
I ask them, ‘What do you know about Islam?’ The true Islam, it’s in the behavior.” 
A number of my interviewees (like Houda) suggested that Islamic epistemologies differed across 
the generations.  
51 
 
Salah (first-generation of Algerian origin), like many first-generation Muslims I met, was very 
doubtful of the general direction that religiosity among the French-raised Muslims was taking. 
Referring to the “rise in radicalization” among the younger generational group, he said: 
“For the first time in the Muslim history, after the death of the Prophet, we have the liberty of 
expression. True liberty! We can talk, discuss, criticize. But the youth here, they believe that the 
era of the Umayyads [and] the Abbasids was the golden era of Islam. But in that era, they killed 
for nothing. In France, they don’t kill for nothing…There is nothing in the Quran that tells you 
not to doubt - on the contrary. But instead of reading Quran and thinking, these young folks have 
made Saudi Arabia their Islam. Everything that folks in Saudi Arabia do must be true Islam.” 
Like Salah, many first-generation Muslims mentioned that the French-raised Muslims “falsely” 
considered Saudi Arabia to be the location of authority on Islam. They mentioned that French-
raised Muslims took Islam and its interpretation coming from Saudi Arabia, especially 
Wahhabism and Salafism, as authentic. 
Cheikh Hamza (first-generation of Tunisian origin), who worked as an imam at multiple 
mosques in the north-eastern suburbs of Paris at the time of the interview, said that the “youth” 
attribute the sacredness of the Kaaba, the holy site located in Saudi Arabia, to the entirety of 
Saudi Arabia:  
“The Salafist trend comes from Saudi Arabia. One believes that what comes from there is 
extraordinary. One believes that everything is sacred. One mixes up the place and that which is 
sacred. The Kaaba and the mosque, from the time of the Prophet, they are sacred. All this is 
sacred, no problem! But we find a bit of mixing between the sense of sacredness, and the 
interpretation and the manner of religious practice. That’s it! I see that everyone has fallen into 
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the same track. They think that whatever they believed over there it's extraordinary. But that is 
false!”  
For Houda (mentioned earlier), the site of authentic knowledge on Islam was located in her 
country of origin (also indicated by Nada and Fedi). At the same time, the French-raised 
Muslims did not agree that the location of “authentic” Islam was either in the country of origin or 
in Saudi Arabia. For them, their own understanding of Islam had developed in the context of 
France (a point that I explore in section 4.5). In addition, according to them, French values and 
Islamic values were both “universal” and based on the “Cartesian ideas of rationality” (Camille 
and Yassine) and required educating oneself in both secular and religious texts.  
For example, in the words of Fareeda (second generation of Pakistani origin):  
“I am very glad that I was born in France, of having emancipated, of having studied, of the 
possibilities [I had] to discover other cultures, of the possibility to find the core of religion and 
realize that the tradition is very wrong. Because when we were young, we learnt [these 
traditions]. For example, my sister has a lot of negative stereotypes about Muslim religion 
because my parents inculcated an education that was rather traditional than religious.” 
Fareeda added that it is in France that she has had the opportunity to read and learn from the 
Quran, which she considers as containing the essence of Islam. If she had grown up in Pakistan, 
like her mother, she would not have had the “freedom” to undertake her study in Islam. She told 
me about the gender-mixed “Islamic science” classes that she enjoyed, an opportunity that exists 
for her because of her location in France (a similar point was also made by Camille). 
French-raised Muslims contrasted their sources of Islamic knowledge with that of the first-
generation Muslims. Many of them reported attending a private institute or a mosque for classes 
on Islam (this included, among others, Camille, Souleymane, and Asma).  
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French-raised Muslims considered knowledge of Quranic Arabic important in order to 
understand the Quran, their preferred source of Islamic knowledge. Many commented how first-
generation immigrants had grown up memorizing Quranic verses in their home country, without 
knowing its meaning.28 Hence, many first-generation Muslims speak a local Arabic dialect. Lina 
(third-generation of Algerian origin) commented on the knowledge of Quranic Arabic of her 
first-generation grandparents:  
“For them it’s like a tradition. You know, they don’t know how to read or to write Arabic. They 
have never read the Quran. They have learned it. They have learned the verses (sourate) while the 
people were telling them. So for them it is more cultural because they have never read [the 
Quran]. They don’t know how to read or write Arabic, but they know [the verses] by heart 
because, since they are young, they are [exposed to] religion.” 
Lina was proud of the fact that she, unlike her grandparents, could read and understand Quranic 
Arabic, in addition to being fluent in French and the Algerian Arabic dialect. She took classes in 
Arabic language while in university. For Lina and for other French-raised respondents, France 
was a better source of Islamic education than the Muslim-majority countries of her grandparents. 
Asma told me about her first-generation mother who had grown up in south of Morocco without 
any knowledge of Arabic. Inspired by the fluency in Arabic and knowledge of Quran held by 
both Asma and her second-generation Muslim father, Asma’s mother had recently started to 
attend classes at the local mosque and study Quran through sources popular among French-raised 
 
28 Quranic Arabic is different from Arabic spoken in many parts of the Middle East, especially in North Africa 
where local Arabic dialects mix French as well as Amazigh languages. 
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Muslims. Asma mentioned: “My mom doesn't know Arabic…She [instead] watches an imam on 
YouTube explain Arabic verses (sourates) in Amazigh [language] instead.”  
In addition to courses on Islam and Quranic Arabic, knowledge on Islam acquired via internet is 
popular among French-raised Muslims. Many sought knowledge on Islam from the “learned” 
(savants) online in addition to the imams in their local mosques. Some of them suggested that I 
watch sermons of imams they liked online when I asked them questions about their religiosity.29  
Farid (second-generation of Algerian origin) who was a part of the Muslim Brotherhood and who 
identified as “ex-Islamist” at the time of the interview said that he had experienced first-hand the 
implications of these differences in sources of Islamic knowledge. Like many French-raised 
Muslims, he began to look for Islamic knowledge away from his first-generation family, 
rejecting the knowledge of religion that came from his family. He said that he stopped singing 
and listening to music, and sharing humor like other members of his family.  
Farid attributed the failure of organizations like UOIF (Union of Islamic Organizations in 
France; known as Muslims of France today) to generational differences. He said that this 
“organization of the old” has no presence on the internet, and therefore had no influence on the 
Islam of the younger generation.  
First-generation Muslims agreed that they had learnt about Islam in their family in their country 
of origin and felt that the French-raised Muslims were rejecting their “traditional” knowledge of 
Islam. For example, at a meeting related to a religious association I volunteered for, Rim (first-
generation of Moroccan origin) said:  
 
29 Suggestions to watch sermons by Zakir Naik and Tariq Ramadan were made frequently.  
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“It is sad when the folks they say that we should throw away the traditions, the traditions that 
come usually from the parents, from the country of origin of the parents. It is maybe because I 
come from Morocco, that I grew up in Morocco, that I appreciate the importance of traditions in 
the religion.” 
Yasmine (second-generation of Algerian origin) told me that she frequently saw tensions arising 
in the families because of this difference in sources of Islamic knowledge: 
“The parents are on a traditional application [of religion], because of [their] culture, in the sense 
that they do what they saw their parents doing. And the youth want to return to the text, to the 
source…Because this older generation did not have access to reading material, there is a form of 
distrust towards them [among those of the younger generation].” 
4.3 Religious attitudes towards gender and ethnic differences 
When Asma (French-born, of Moroccan origin) was admitted to attend a prestigious French 
school outside of Paris, her first-generation mother was not happy. Her mother commented on 
Asma’s ambitions for higher education by saying that Asma was “a woman only in body, [but] a 
man in head.” According to Asma, this was because her mother was “conservative” and not 
“open-minded”, unlike her second-generation father who did not have the same ideas about ideal 
roles for Muslim women as her mother had.  
Like many of my French-born respondents, Asma recounted stories of differences in attitudes 
towards gender and ethnic differences that she encountered in her relations with first-generation 
immigrants. She recounted to me stories of how her father, who was born in France, would play 
football with her along with a group of boys while her mother, who was born in Morocco, was 
against any form of “mixing of boys and girls.” She attributed this to the “traditional” ideas of 
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the first-generation population overall, because, according to her, they “mixed” religion with the 
culture of the country of origin. 
Fareeda (second-generation of Pakistani origin) told me that in Islam, there is a fundamental 
equality between all Muslims, irrespective of their gender or ethnicity (a point that was also 
made by Asma): “In no instance does my religion oppress me or my status as a woman, on the 
contrary.” When it came to practices like pre-marriage virginity tests for women, French-raised 
Muslim women said that first-generation immigrants “confused religion and tradition” (Asma). 
Some of my first-generation respondents accepted this critique. In the words of Safa (first-
generation of Tunisian origin): 
“Families use religion to control their children, because they fear that they would give up 
everything that is important to their parents. So a lot of them say that the patriarchal hierarchy in 
the family is religious, in order to gain legitimacy, [in order to have] their power and control 
[over] the children.” 
In addition to gender attitudes, attitudes related to Muslims of other ethnic groups varied over 
immigrant-generation. Several French-raised Muslims commented about the “amalgamation” 
that their first-generation parents (like other first-generation Muslims) made between religion 
and ethnicity.  
Nesrine (second-generation of Algerian origin) advised both Hadia (also second-generation of 
Algerian origin) and me: “Never listen to parents! Listen to Allah!” We were in the Grand 
Mosque of Paris one afternoon while she told us how her first-generation parents were not 
accepting of her marriage with a man of Togolese origin who has converted to Islam because, for 
them, “Islam demanded marriage with a man of the same ethnicity” (field notes, 15 March 
57 
 
2019). She repeated many times how the Quran demands that Muslim women marry pious 
Muslim men irrespective of their ethnic background.  
A similar comment was also made by Fareeda (second generation of Pakistani origin) who said 
that her parents would have wanted her to marry a Muslim who is from the same region in 
Pakistan as her parents. But Fareeda had decided that she would marry any Muslim man of her 
liking, irrespective of ethnicity. 
French-raised Muslims indicated that first-generation Muslims conflated ethnic-affiliation 
(usually Arab) with religious-affiliation. Sophie (third-generation of Algerian and Tunisian 
origin), whose first-generation grandparents were practicing Muslims but who did not identify 
herself as a Muslim, told me that many in her ethnic community had difficulty in accepting her 
Arab identity: 
“On one hand I have a Maghrebi family and on the other hand I am called Sophie [a French 
name]. But the Arabs [of first-generation] do not understand [my Arab identity] because I am not 
religious. They tell me, ‘You are not an Arab because you eat pork.’” 
Sophie told me that first-generation Muslims of Arab origin did not understand that being Arab 
did not always mean being Muslim and that “there are also Arabs of Jewish or Christian faith.”  
A similar equating of affiliation to Islam and Arabness also took place in the mosques. Many of 
my French-raised interviewees complained about the first-generation imams in mosques who, in 
many cases, only spoke Arabic. For example, Camille (second-generation of Algerian origin) 
told me that during her recent visit to a Parisian mosque to hear the Friday sermon, the imam 
spoke mostly in Arabic and little French. Camille was sad that many first-generation women 
with sub-Saharan origins couldn't understand the sermon. Souleymane (second-generation of 
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Senegalese origin) shared his experience of feeling discriminated, as someone of Sub-Saharan 
African origin, in a local mosque committee where he volunteered. Most mosques in France, he 
mentioned, were run by first-generation Muslims who wished to maintain ethnic majorities in 
their mosques.   
Most mosques in France have a dominant ethnic group; the language of the sermon, and the 
provenance of the imam depends on which ethnic group dominates. These mosques are largely 
run by and frequented by first-generation Muslims, according to my interviewees as well as my 
observation.  
Farid (second-generation of Algerian origin) indicated that mosques were built by the first-
generation and are run by them even today (this was also noted by Souleymane). When the 
mosques were built, he said, they were meant for migrant Muslims who would remain 
temporarily in France; this meant that sermons took place in Arabic (and do so even today) in 
most of the mosques across France.  
In addition, French-raised Muslims (especially women) indicated that they prefer to have 
religious places that allow for mixing of genders as well as for women to take up leadership 
positions in leading prayers. Camille gave me the example of some mosques in the United States 
that she had visited and liked because of the possibility of diverse genders and ethnicities to 
congregate in the same space to talk about religion and spirituality. Safa (first-generation of 
Tunisian origin) also indicated that the “ugliness of women’s prayer spaces without any 
sunlight,” prayers in Arabic, as well as “domination of first-generation women, especially of 
Algerian descent” at the Grand mosque of Paris was driving away the younger generation.  
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The popularity of associations that organize Islamic gatherings open to all genders and 
ethnicities, as well as the popularity of social media groups that bring French-raised Muslims of 
mixed ethnicities and genders to organize alternative spiritual activities, reinforces respondents’ 
suggestion that the younger generation associates religious activities with gender and ethnic 
mixing, unlike first-generation immigrants.30  
4.4 Dividing the sacred from the profane 
In a post-performance discussion of the play “Lettres à Nour” (Letters to Nour) which I attended, 
Farid (second generation of Algerian origin) mentioned that he was troubled by the 
conversations among Muslims of younger generation which he saw as being “too much religion 
but not enough of God.” He talked about the “obsession” of the French-raised young Muslims to 
place things in a “binary relation” (rapport binaire) (fieldnotes, April 2019).31 He gave the 
example of the use of two binary divisions popular among this younger population – “the 
Ummah against the West” and “haram versus halal.” My first-generation interviewees like 
Houda and Salah added “believers versus unbelievers (kafir)” to the list while Yasmine (second 
generation) mentioned the use of “believing only versus practicing Muslim” as a binary among 
French-raised Muslims.  
 
30 Two popular social media groups among French-raised Muslims are “Iftar Networking” and “Muslim Initiatives” 
on Facebook. See https://www.facebook.com/groups/Iftar.Networking/ and 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/1893897954260075/. One devoted member of these groups started “Salatsurfing” 
recently. It is an app based on the idea of Couchsurfing and allows Muslims to find local Muslims to pray together, 
many times in homes or other private spaces. See https://www.facebook.com/salatsurfing/ (last accessed on 20 
January 2020) 
31 Farid Abdelkrim’s play “Letters to Nour” is aimed to combat radicalization among the youth. He stages it around 
France for middle- and high school students. The one I attended was staged for high-school students in a norther 
suburb of Paris. I had the occasion to interview him after the play. 
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Many of my interviewees commented on the recurrent use of “binaries” by French-raised 
Muslims.  Yasmine (second generation of Algerian origin) said:  
“The new generation that is young wants to return to the sources and demonstrate to these older 
folks their ignorance [related to Islam]. Sometimes it is said in a [socially] violent manner. For 
example, they keep saying - this is bid’ah, this is bid’ah, that is bid’ah (heresy).” 
Bid’ah (heresy) is used as a close equivalent to “haram” in conversations among French-raised 
Muslims noted by my interlocutors. In its everyday usage, “haram” refers to that which is not 
religiously permissible while “halal” refers to that which is permissible. Among Muslims I spoke 
with, it was used (in most cases) either in reference to dietary restrictions (pork and alcohol 
consumption are considered haram) or to refer to acts that are considered haram (like stealing or 
pre-marital sex).  
My interviewees noted higher importance placed on the consumption of “halal” food among 
French-raised Muslims. Camille, a second-generation Muslim of Algerian origin, mentioned that 
her French-born cousins are obsessed with haram-halal binary to an extent that “if you don’t eat 
halal and you are Arab, they would start making fun of you (in a harassing manner).”  
For Cheikh Hamza (first-generation of Tunisian origin), the use of binaries among French-raised 
Muslims “has become a trend, a label, to catalog other people…and to judge other folks.” He 
commented on the equivalence made between “West, kafir, and enemies” among the younger 
generation of Muslims, and tried to deconstruct this in the Islamic science class that I attended 
before the interview.32   
 
32 Farid’s play also raised similar points. I do not believe that Cheikh Hamza’s class was framed in anticipation of 
my attendance given that he had agreed to be interviewed without knowing the exact topic of my research.  
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In addition to continuous use of binaries to “catalog” people, many of my interviewees 
commented that the French-raised Muslims have stricter ideas of what consists of haram and 
halal dietary practices and what consists as “correct” religious practices. The younger generation, 
according to my interviewees, also made a distinction between “believing only” Muslims 
(croyant) and Muslims who also practice (praticant). Among practicing Muslims, belief in God 
was assumed. 
Figure 6: An “oriental” grocery store selling food products from the Levant and North 
Africa regions. 
 
* All food products, including meats, sold in such stores are halal. 
 
Yasmine (second-generation of Algerian origin) told me about an observation she had made at 
various Muslim gatherings. She had noted that during gathering among older generation folks, a 
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public call to prayer was made at the time of the prayer and everyone got up to pray even if they 
might not have otherwise prayed. But during the gatherings with younger generation Muslims, 
those who made the call to prayer would ask “who will do the prayers?” It was only those who 
“practiced” that would leave to pray. 
That this division between “believing only” versus “practicing” did not exist among the first-
generation Muslims is demonstrated in the case of Camille’s (second-generation of Algerian 
origin) first-generation father of Algerian origin. Camille described her father’s Ramadan 
practices as follows:  
“During Ramadan, my father won’t drink alcohol, he won’t have his apero [pre-meal drink and 
snack] before having his meal. He waits for the adhan [call to prayer, in this case indicating that 
the sun has set and the fast may be broken] before his iftar [fast-breaking evening] meal, [and] he 
really respects it. He fully lives Ramadan [with its rules] in a serious manner. He wakes himself 
up early to eat, it’s just that he doesn’t pray…So I asked him – Why do you do this? And he said 
it makes him feel better, he eats well but not too much, he thinks about those who have little 
[resources]. This man is a perfect Muslim, but not a Muslim. Bizarrely, father has always fasted 
for Ramadan. Because we are Algerians, and traditionally it is like this.” 
Camille’s father consumed alcohol and pork meat outside of the month of Ramadan and does not 
believe in God, according to Camille. This lack of belief disqualified her father from being a 
Muslim in Camille’s view.   
First-generation Muslims, like Nada, contrasted their religiosity with that of French-born 
Muslims by calling it “not as constraining.” Nada (first-generation of Algerian origin) described 
her and her family’s religious practices as follows:  
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“I love my values and my traditions. They are the best…My Islam does not prevent me from 
living. We do the prayers. We don’t do anything strange. We don’t steal. We do our best! But [we 
are] not religious-religious [like the younger generation].”  
In addition, Salima, a first-generation Moroccan student who I met at an Eid event in the summer 
of 2018 told me about her first-generation friends who ordered pork-based burgers for iftar (to 
break the fast) by mistake and ate them while having full knowledge that they were haram. She 
also told me stories of other first-generation Muslims who would say “Bismillah” and then drink 
alcohol.33 That strict guidelines related to haram versus halal were not followed among first-
generation Muslims was noted by several of my French-raised Muslim interlocutors and 
confessed by first-generation Muslims (like Sami and Salah). 
Some of my first-generation interlocutors saw the use of binaries as a sign of “radicalization” 
among French-raised Muslims. Commenting on the use of believer-unbeliever binary, Houda 
(first-generation of Moroccan origin) said:  
“Their [French-raised Muslims’] heads are empty and then they leave to join ISIS…But to kill is 
not Islam. They say ‘Oh they are all unbelievers.’ But it isn’t for you to decide who is an 
unbeliever. It is for Allah to decide.”  
In contrast to this form of religiosity among French-raised Muslims, many first-generation 
Muslims described their religiosity as being “moderate” (Salah and Nada).  
While some saw the use of binaries as a sign of radicalization, others saw it as a form of “identity 
crisis” and linked this “crisis” to “not fitting into either the French society or the society in the 
country of origin” (Yasmine). Camille described the use of haram-halal binary among her 
 
33 It is a common practice among Muslims to say “Bismillah” (In the name of Allah) before starting a meal. 
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French-born cousins as being a “way of cultural overcompensation” linked to a lack of sense of 
belonging in either France or their country of origin. 
4.5 Claiming Islamic identity 
I met Cheikh Hamza (first-generation of Tunisian origin) at a mosque in a north-eastern suburb 
of Paris on a Saturday after the afternoon prayer. I attended the class on Islamic sciences that he 
gave every Saturday to French-raised Muslim students of all genders and ethnicities before the 
interview. Cheikh Hamza (first generation of Tunisian origin) was convinced that there is a wide 
gap between religiosity of first-generation Muslims and French-raised Muslims. One of the 
differences, for him, is that the Islam practiced by the French-raised Muslims was an Islam of 
“appearances”: 
 “Today, there has been a return to religion starting with the second generation and third 
generation. It is this that I have remarked, that they [French-raised Muslims] demonstrate a 
religious practice that is pretty special [and] which concentrates itself on appearances. Today 
[among the younger generation] it is the religious practices specifically that are based on 
appearance.”  
Like Cheikh Hamza, many first-generation immigrants I interviewed remarked about the rise of 
“identity Islam” (Islam identitaire) among the French-raised Muslims that gave importance to 
“appearance” or “labels” associated with Islam.  
One manifestation of this “identity Islam” was that the French-raised Muslims talked “too much” 
about religion. Aziza (second-generation of Algerian and Tunisian origin), who identifies as an 
atheist, told me how she gets annoyed when the younger generation of Muslims bring up Islam. 
“One doesn’t need to vomit all the time [about religion],” she told me. Moussa (first-generation 
of Libyan and Malian origin) also mentioned that “I do not scream all the time that I am Muslim” 
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especially since France is a “secular country,” contrasting his behavior to other Muslims of the 
younger generation. 
The idea that secularism in France entailed not speaking about Islam or demanding religious 
accommodations was present among many first-generation Muslims and contrasted with what 
they saw among French-raised Muslims. This came up especially in debates related to hijab.  
Fedi, a first-generation of Algerian origin and a practicing Muslim, finds it “not logical” that 
Muslims wear religious clothing in France. When asked whether he wears any religious signs, 
Fedi said: 
“No, here in France, no! In Algeria, yes! In Algeria I wear special clothes to do the Friday 
prayers, but not here in France. Sometimes one should be intelligent. One should respect. In my 
country (chez moi), I do it, okay. But I am in a foreign country, in a secular country, I go to the 
mosque of the Islamic center and do my prayers, but without these [religious signs or 
clothing]....About those who wear religious signs, I see that it is not logical…well, this is a 
secular country, and secularism bans the wearing of religious signs in the public space, so one 
should not [wear them].” 
Some of my interviewees interpreted the reclaiming of Islamic identity among French-raised 
Muslims as linked to “victimization” or “resistance” to Islamophobia. Sophie (third generation of 
Algerian and Tunisian origin) said that religion becomes a form of “provocation, a fashion, a 
sentiment of belonging” among French-raised Muslims against the “French-style anti-Islam” 
sentiments. On a similar note, Negar (first-generation of Iranian origin) said: 
“In France, this can be a form of reclamation of identity (revendication identitaire), like ‘I 
differentiate myself from the others,’ or to resist the dominant current [of Islamophobia]. [It is 
also] a form of victimization among certain Muslims.” 
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A key difference between first-generation Muslims and French-raised Muslims is citizenship. 
This played a crucial role in differentiating the formation and manifestation of religious identity 
between the two generations. While first-generation Muslims were either not French citizens or 
had become naturalized French citizens, French-raised Muslims (in most cases) were French by 
birth.34 This meant that French-raised Muslims were comfortable asking for religious 
accommodations and reclaiming Islamic identity in the public space, acts which many belonging 
to the first-generation saw as “not logical,” “too loud,” or “making too many identity claims.” 
Souleymane (second generation of Senegalese origin) described his Islamic identity as follows: 
“My Islam, I learned it here in France. And the constraints we face are related to being in 
France.” He contrasted it with the Muslim identity of the first-generation:  
“Our parents considered themselves as foreign Muslims in a foreign country, so the relation with 
religion remains discrete. So the first generation didn't make a political project out of religion. At 
the residence halls for the migrants, they had a small room to do prayers, that's how it was! Later 
political Islam developed, because everyone was like ‘oh you shouldn't have to pray alone in your 
house.’ The second generation was like ‘we are not foreigners, we are French.’…It is the second 
generations’ claims that lead to confrontation with the secular French folks. For our parents it was 
more important that we go to public schools and become engineers rather than go to a Muslim 
school and do prayers on time.” 
 
34 Some of my first-generation Muslim interlocutors indicated that they were not French by citizenship; others talked 
about becoming naturalized citizens of France – a process that many described as humiliating. On the other hand, 
birth in France meant access to citizenship for French-born Muslims. 
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French-raised Muslims, like Asma (third generation of Moroccan origin), considered first-
generation immigrants as the “silent generation” because of their reluctance to demand political 
rights related to religious accommodation: 
“The first generation of immigrant people, they do not show their religion, their culture. They try 
to keep this in the home…For example, they don’t have too many mosques in here [when they 
arrived in 1960s]…They don’t show religion. They try to integrate in France. But our generation, 
they show more.” 
Lina (third generation of Algerian origin) told me a similar story about the generation of her 
grandparents: 
“I think, because my grandparents, when they came to France, they didn't want to make people 
notice them and they didn't feel like at home, so they were not trying to catch the attention, you 
know, and their children, they are the ones who did this, you know, the March of the Beurs [a 
North African rights movement in the 1980s]. They were like, we are from here, we are French, 
we are born in France and raised here, we have rights, like any other citizens.” 
The difference in citizenship was also reflected in the institutionalization of Islam in France, 
according to my French-raised interviewees. For example, Farid (second-generation of Algerian 
origin) mentioned that the mosques and other religious organizations in France were set up by 
first-generation Muslims in order to maintain ties with the country of origin to which they hoped 
to return to at some point in their lives. Souleymane also raised a similar point, adding that the 
presence of Islam, for the first-generation, was supposed to remain “foreign” and “temporary,” 
unlike for the French-raised Muslims – a matter that was reflected in the continued use of Arabic 
for sermons and reliance on imams brought to France from the countries of origin. This, together, 
meant that these organizations were not able to bring support of the French-raised Muslims. That 
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the first-generation imams in mosques only stuck to explanation of Quranic texts rather than talk 
about how to apply Quranic lessons in the French context was a popular complain among the 
French-raised Muslims I interacted with and they attributed this to the generational gap they felt 






Section 5: Conclusion and discussion 
My goal in this paper is to contribute to the conceptualization of differences in religiosity 
between first-generation Muslim immigrants and their French-raised Muslim descendants. This 
paper takes discrepancy in the literature in evidence related to existence of religious generational 
gap as the starting point. I used a mixed methods approach to reflect on this discrepancy, i.e. I 
analyzed secondary quantitative survey data (where there is little evidence of a religious 
generational gap) and compared it primary qualitative case studies (where I higlighted the 
themes my interviewees used to talk about the existence of a religious generational gap).  
I examined results from available quantitative surveys (i.e. Pew 2006, TeO 2008, IFOP 2019); I 
compared indicators of religiosity for first- (foreign-born) and second-generation (French-born) 
Muslims in France to see if we could find significant differences in religiosity between the two 
generational groups, especially in observables/outcomes mentioned in previous qualitative 
studies. I find that while quantitative survey data provided no generalizable evidence of the 
presence of religious generational gap, many among my interviewees as well as others I 
interacted with (as a part of collection of qualitative data) talked about the existence of religious 
generational gap (in many cases without me prompting them to). I used this primary qualitative 
data (interviews and observations) collected among Muslims of immigrant origin in France to 
shed light on aspects of religiosity where generational differences were identified by my 
interlocutors and which are not measured in available quantitative surveys.  
70 
 
The qualitative data allowed me to theorize five general themes around which Muslims agreed 
that religious generational gap exists:  
1. Choice versus inheritance of Islam 
2. Islamic epistemologies 
3. Religious attitudes towards gender and ethnic differences  
4. Dividing the sacred from the profane  
5. Claiming Islamic identity 
It is a truism that the differences that we see in religiosity between first-generation immigrants 
and their descendants are not solely due to immigrant-generational gap. Differences may exist 
because of differences in age (with first-generation immigrants as a group being overall older 
than second- or third-generation immigrants), period effects (for example, younger Muslims of 
all generations have some common religious identity traits because of a specific political 
experience they had that their older peers didn’t), and cohort effects (for example, second-
generation Muslims who did not experience the 2004 hijab ban in public schools may have a 
different religious identity than those who did).  
In addition, the narratives of religious generational gap that I noted during my field research are 
heterogenous, can be internally contradictory, and use tropes from public discourse on Muslims 
(including tropes that portray Muslims negatively).35 As shown in the conversations around 
religious generational gap, multiple themes can coexist at the same time and can be presented 
sometimes in contradictory terms during the same conversation. In addition, religion and 
 
35 For example, one popular narrative among first-generation Muslims was that second- and third-generation Muslim 
“youth” were radicalizing. This is similar to the popular discourse in the French media that Muslim youth overall are 
undergoing high rates of radicalization.  
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religiosity are not the sole references for identity-making among Muslims in France. Immigrant-
generational differences related to citizenship and belonging, education, and socio-economic 
status are also present among Muslims in France (as well as elsewhere in Europe).  
At the same time, many of my interlocutors agreed that immigrant generation remains a salient 
category along which differences in religiosity and religious identity are found. For example, 
Camille (second-generation of Algerian origin) mentioned during the interview that she was 
quite surprised when she figured that folks of second-generation who have the same age as her 
parents have similar religiosity and religious identity as she has, given similarities in immigration 
trajectories. Many of the French-raised Muslims felt affinity with others of their immigrant 
generation, especially in terms of how they understood and practiced religion.  
Third-generation immigrants indicated the validity of combining second- and third-generation 
Muslims in one group while understanding generational differences in religiosity. For example, 
while Lina (third-generation) talked about some differences in life experiences between herself 
and her second-generation parents, she said that her religiosity was similar to that of her parents. 
A similar remark was also made by Asma and Sophie (both belonging to third-generation) in 
relation to their second-generation parents. 
What emerges from the comparison of available survey data and primary qualitative data is that 
the general gap might not necessarily exist in the frequency of religious practices, such as 
wearing of religious signs overall, or attendance at mosques. Rather, generational gap might exist 
in the motivation for performing religious practices (with French-raised Muslims performing 
religious practices out of “choice” in contrast to “imitating” their elder family members); in 
sources through which information about “authentic” religion is obtained; in attitudes towards 
gender and ethnic differences (with religion representing different sets of values for different 
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generations); in desires to “catalogue” the world into sacred versus profane (like halal versus 
haram); and in the claims to religious accommodation made by different generations (with 
French-raised Muslims potentially showing higher rates of demands for accommodation 
compared to first-generation immigrants, given difference in citizenship and socialization). 
In order to claim that these differences exist, the findings from this research will need to be 
tested through systematic evidence that is more thoroughly representative of Muslims in France. 
Qualitative case studies have shed light on the complexities of religiosity and religious identity 
that could be used to collect better-quality survey data on religiosity among European Muslims. 
In Table 5.1, I propose survey questions that make use of the insights gained from the mixed-
methods nature of this paper. Given the highly mediatized nature of conversations of religious 
generational gap, the experience of this gap as a social fact among Muslims of immigrant origin, 
and the political use of religious generational gap as an indicator of integration into the European 
society, accurate, representative information on the existence and nature of this generational gap 
is important for both scholarly and public debates.  
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Table 5.1: Observable generational difference in religiosity and possible survey questions.
Theme First-generation immigrant Muslims French-raised Muslims Possible survey questions
CHOICE VERSUS INHERITANCE OF ISLAM
1 Religious clothing -importance
Wearing of religious clothing is not 
considered important.
Wearing of religious clothing is  considered 
important
According to you, how important is it for a Muslim to 
wear religious clothing? (scale 1-10; with 10 very 
important)
2 Religious clothing -motivation
Hijab (or other forms of religious clothing) 
are considered inherited  from the country 
of origin.
Hijab (or other forms of religious clothing) 
are considered as chosen  after personal 
reflection.
If you do wear a hijab or other forms of religious 
clothing, which of these best reflects your motivation 
behind it? - Personal reflection; Inherited traditions 
from family or religious community.
3 Religious clothing -style of hijab
Hijab (or other forms of religious clothing) 
reflect styles from the country of origin.
Hijab (or other forms of religious clothing) 
are worn in styles that reflect personal taste 
and do not reflect styles from the country of 
origin.
If you are currently wearing a hijab, what kind of 
style does it reflect? - Style of ethnic group (like that 
worn by female family members); Personal taste 
4 Religious clothing -modesty of hijab
Stricter  (and more uniform) guidelines 
about what kind of hijab is considered 
modest.
Varied  guidelines about what kind of hijab is 
considered modest.
Do you think that a colorful hijab worn in the form of 
a turban is…? - Pretty modest, modest enough, not 
modest enough, not modest at all.
ISLAMIC EPISTEMOLOGIES
5 Authentic knowledge -location
Knowledge of authentic Islam considered to 
be received in the country of origin .
Knowledge of authentic Islam considered to 
be received in Saudi Arabia  OR 
Knowledge of authentic Islam considered to 
be received in France.
Imagine that you have a choice to hear a sermon from 
imams with following background: a French imam, an 
imam from Saudi Arabia, an imam from your country 
of origin. Who would you choose to hear?
6 Authentic knowledge -source
Current knowledge about Islam obtained 
through family and religious community in 
the country of origin.
Current knowledge about Islam obtained 
through study of Quran and through internet.
From where does the majority  of your knowledge 
about Islam come from? (multiple choices possible) - 
family and community in country of origin, family 
and community in France, Quran, Internet.
7 Authentic knowledge -religious school
Did not attend a religious school in addition 
to general K-12 education.
Attended a religious school in addition to 
general K-12 education (can include a 
mosque, private Islamic school, university 
studies on religion).
Have you attended, for a significant period of time, 
one of the following for religious education - courses 
at mosque, private Islamic school, or university?
8 Authentic knowledge -Quranic Arabic
Knowledge of Quranic Arabic is largely 
absent, even though many may speak 
Arabic dialect.
Knowledge of Quranic Arabic is present.
Can you speak, read, and write in Arabic? 
If yes, what kind? - Fus'ha, Shaami, Masri, Darija, 
other
Do not consider knowledge of Quranic 
Arabic as important in acquiring knowledge 
about Islam.
Considers knowledge of Quranic Arabic as 
important in acquiring knowledge about 
Islam.
Do you think it is important to speak Quranic (or 
Fus'ha) Arabic in order to understand Islam?
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Table 5.1: Continued
Theme First-generation immigrant Muslims French-raised Muslims Possible survey questions
RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES TOWARDS GENDER AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES
9 Gender - segregation
Presence of idea that gender segregation in 
public and religious spaces is prescribed by 
Islam and that it should be upheld.
Presence of idea that gender segregation in 
public and religious spaces is not  prescribed 
by Islam and that it should not be upheld. 
Do you think that individuals of different genders 
should be…? - segregated OR allowed to mix in 
public and religious spaces.
Do you think that segregation of individuals by 
gender in public and religious spaces is prescribed by 
Islam?
10 Gender - traditions Presence of idea that marrying a virgin bride is recommended by religion. 
Presence of idea that marrying a virgin bride 
is recommended by traditions in country of 
origin and not linked to religion.  
Do you think that marrying a virgin bride is…? - not 
linked to and not recommended by religion OR linked 
to and recommended by religion.  
11 Gender - mosques No desire for female leadership in mosque spaces.
Desire for female leadership in mosque 
spaces.
Would you consider it desirable for your local 
mosque to have women in leadership positions, like 
having a female imam?
12 Ethnicity - marriage Considers that one should marry a Muslim in one's ethnic community.
Considers that one can marry a Muslim 
belonging to any ethnic community.
Do you think that it is okay to marry a Muslim who 
does not belong to your ethnic group?
13 Ethnicity - mosques Considers that mosques should cater to one specific ethnic community.
Considers that mosques should cater to an 
ethnically diverse Muslim community.
Imagine you had two mosques close to your place. 
One mosque caters to your ethnic community and the 
other is diverse. Which one would you go to? 
DIVIDING THE SACRED FROM THE PROFANE
14 Cataloguing the world
Absence of belief in binaries like "Us 
versus the West," "haram versus halal," or 
"believer versus unbeliever."
High importance given to binaries like "Us 
versus the West," "haram versus halal," or 
"believer versus unbeliever."
Do you think that non-Muslims, especially those in 
the West, are different from Muslims?
Do you think that non-Muslims, especially those in 
the West, are enemies of Islam?
15 Halal-Haram Eating halal diet not as important Eating halal diet important How would you rate the importance of eating halal food in Islam? (scale 1-10; with 10 very important) 
16 Halal-Haram Halal diet not strictly followed Halal diet strictly followed How often do you consume alcohol? - never, rarely, OR frequently.
17 Believing-Practicing Idea of division between "believing" and"practicing" Muslims does not exist.
Idea of division between "believing" and 
"practicing" Muslims exists.
Would you categorize a person who does not believe 




Theme First-generation immigrant Muslims French-raised Muslims Possible survey questions
CLAIMING ISLAMIC IDENTITY IN SOCIETY
18 Islam in France Considers that Islam is a foreign religion Considers that Islam is a French religion According to you, the Islam that you practice is a..? - foreign religion OR French religion.
19 Religiousaccommodations
Does not ask for religious accommodation 
in the public spaces.
Does not ask for religious accommodation in 
the public spaces.
Would you go out to protest against the 2004 law 
banning the wearing of hijab in public schools?
Would you write to your local politician asking for 
halal food options in school canteens?
20 Religious organizations
Considers that mosques and other religious 
organizations should help maintain links 
with country of origin.
Considers that mosques and other religious 
organizations should help address questions 
pertaining to living as Muslims in France.
Which of these two, according to you, should be one 
of the main purposes of mosques in France? - 
Maintaining links with country of origin OR 
Addressing questions pertaining to living as Muslims 
in France.
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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE. 
The following questions guided the semi-structured interviews that I undertook with first-
generation and French-raised descendants of immigrants who were either practicing Muslims or 
‘cultural’ Muslims in the sense that they had been exposed to Islam in their family while growing 
up but did not necessarily identify as Muslim at the time of the interview.  
1. Do you have an (im)migrant background? If yes, who in your family migrated to France?
a. From where?
b. In which year?
c. What was the purpose of (im)migration of [self/family members]?
2. What were the religious beliefs, practices, or traditions that you were exposed to in your
childhood? (add: this could be in your family, in your ethnic community, or in your
religious community)
3. Do you continue to have the same beliefs and follow same practices and traditions as you
did in your childhood today? What remains same and what has changed? (note to self:





e. Religious Associations (affiliation)
f. Consumption of halal food
g. Religious markers (clothing, jewelry, etc)
h. Language (Arabic/Berber/other)
i. Courses in Islam (at a mosque for instance)
j. Other
4. Difference in religiosity in family (note to self: ask for examples for each question and
use the list above (a-j) to guide the responses)
a. [If first-generation] Do you think that there is a generational gap in religiosity
between you and your children? Between you and your grandchildren?
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b. [If second-generation] Do you think that there is a generational gap in religiosity
between you and your parents? Between your siblings and your parents?
c. [If third-generation] Do you think that there is a generational gap in religiosity
between you and your grandparents? Between your grandparents and your
parents?
5. Do you think that there is a religious generational gap overall in your ethnic Muslim
community between first-generation and French-raised descendants of first-generation?
6. Do you think that there is a religious generational gap between first-generation Muslim








7. Number of children
8. Religion (of self; type of religious tradition and/or sect)
9. Religion of family members
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES. 
Name Gender Age Origin Religion Migrated toFrance Education Occupation
First generation
1 Ahmed Male 25 Mali Muslim In his early 20s High school Unemployed
2 Cheikh Hamza Male mid 50s Tunisia Muslim - - Imam at multiple mosques in Paris region
3 Fatima Female late 50s Morocco Muslim In 1989 High school Unemployed
4 Fedi Male mid 20s Algeria Muslim In 2016 Master's degree Student
5 Hakim Male 80 Algeria Muslim At age 21 Primary school Retired
6 Houda Female mid 40s Morocco Muslim In 1990s Undergraduate Teacher (kindergarten)
7 Moussa Male 25 Mali Muslim In his early 20s Master's degree Student and part-time application developer
8 Nada Female 43 Algeria Muslim At age 30 High school Domestic help provider
9 Negar Female late 20s Iran Agnostic In her early 20s Master's degree Researcher finishing doctoral degree
10 Safa Female 34 Tunisia Muslim In 2012 Master's degree Student
11 Salah Male mid 40s Algeria Muslim In 2003 High school Truck driver
12 Sami Male early 50s Algeria Muslim In 1992 Professional degree Fire-fighter
13 Zeineb Female 74 Algeria Muslim In 1960 Primary school Retired
Second generation
14 Aziza Female late 50s Algeria Atheist At age 3 Master's degree Communication manager for local radio
15 Camille Female 27 Algeria Muslim At age 7 Undergraduate Student
16 Fareeda Female 32 Pakistan Muslim Born in France Doctor of Medicine Practicing medical doctor
17 Farid Abdelkrim* Male 52 Algeria Muslim Born in France Master's degree Comedian
18 Leila Female 30 Algeria Muslim Born in France Doctor of Medicine Practicing medical doctor
19 Souleymane Male 38 Senegal Muslim Born in France Undergraduate Heads multiple non-religious associations
20 Yasmine Female 28 Algeria Muslim Born in France Master's degree Part-time lecturer
21 Yassine Male 33 Morocco Muslim At age 3 PhD Heads a religious association
Third generation
22 Asma Female 27 Morocco Muslim Born in France Master's degree Teacher (high-school)
23 Lina Female 26 Algeria Muslim Born in France Master's degree Junior lawyer in private firm
24 Marie Female 30 Algeria Atheist Born in France Professional degree Artist
25 Sophie Female 29 Algeria Atheist Born in France Master's degree Communication manager in private company
Note: The information above was obtained at the time of the interview and is valid for 2018-19. 
*Indicates use of real name. All other names have been changed to maintain anonymity of my interviewees.
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APPENDIX C: LIFE STORIES OF INTERVIEWEES.  
In this section, I present stories of the lives of my interviewees as they were narrated to me. I 
have hoped here to capture their diverse experiences of being of immigrant-origin and practicing 
Muslim (in most cases). 
C.1: First-generation immigrants
Ahmed (25) is a first-generation immigrant of Malian origins who was educated in Libya. He 
moved to France after obtaining his high-school diploma, like his friend Moussa (described later 
in this section). Unlike Moussa, he did not continue into higher education and was unemployed 
at the time we met for the interview. 
I interviewed Ahmed in a southern suburb of Paris in his state-subsidized apartment where he 
lives with his white partner belonging to Jehovah’s witness, their baby son, and multiple pets. He 
was wearing a dark long jellaba and spoke at length about his “conversion” to Islam and the 
increase in his piety in recent years. Because of the French education he received in a school 
frequented by the children of French expats in Libya, his religious trajectory and relation to 
Islam lay somewhere in between that found among first-generation immigrants and that found 
among second-generation immigrants. He grew up being a “deist” like his father; his mother is a 
practicing Muslim. It was while his partner was pregnant with their child that he began to read 
the Quran and decided that he was Muslim. 
Ahmed agrees that there is a generational gap in religiosity. Like other first-generation Muslims, 
he thinks that there is widespread radicalization among the younger generation and attributes it to 
“bad comprehension” (mauvaise compréhension) of the Quran.    
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Cheikh Hamza (mid-50s) worked as an imam in multiple mosques in the north-eastern suburbs 
of Paris. He has Tunisian origins and goes back frequently to Tunisia to serve as an imam in 
mosques there.  
Cheikh Hamza sees many differences between religiosity and religious practices among the first-
generation of immigrants and their younger descendants. For example, he agreed that the first-
generation have religious practices that are “more or less traditional” while it is only recently that 
those belonging to the younger generation are “turning toward religion and toward [religious] 
practices more than before.” Yet, he is not happy with what he found in this younger generation; 
he sees that their religiosity is more about “appearance” and that they are more interested in 
“cataloguing the people and judging the people.” Like Ahmed, he attributes this to the “bad 
comprehension” of religion among the younger generation. What the younger generation needs, 
according to Cheikh, is “a positive [religious] discourse that is distant from hatred and which 
gives hope and shows how to succeed in studies” for “religion is not limited to the mosque.” 
Fatima (late 50s) first came to France in the 1980s as a part of a classical dance troupe from 
Morocco. In 1989, she decided to permanently stay in France. She faced many issues for the 
following decade in relation to regularizing her status in France, which meant that she could not 
travel outside of France during this period. She told me that the loneliness she faced in this 
period made her belief in Allah stronger.  
I met Fatima multiple times, including at the Grand Mosque as well as at a café for an interview. 
She was always dressed modestly and wore a winter hat even in warm weather; this tactic to 
cover one’s head without wearing a hijab is popular among many French Muslims given the 
increasing marginalization of women who wear a hijab in public. Like many first-generation 
women, she feels like she is policed by other Muslims especially because she is single and 
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without children. When I spoke with her, Fatima was supported by disability welfare, and spent 
her time frequenting mosques and praying – an act that made her “feel good”. She mentioned 
how she has to make an extra effort to pray in France, unlike in “bled” (home country) where 
praying was a part of a communal routine.  
Overall, she saw the Muslim Arab youth in France as “corrupted”. She talked about how the 
children of many of her friends had “run after money” and “lost their deen” (faith). She 
compared these young Arabs with Black immigrants, whom she saw as more dedicated to their 
families back in their country of origin; she told me how she saw many of them regularly 
sending remittances back home at local Western Union offices.  
Fedi (late 20s) was born and raised in Algeria in a village close to Béjaïa until he arrived in 
France a year before we met for the interview. At the time of our interview, he was doing his 
master’s degree in Arabic literature and marketing; it was for the purpose of studies that he had 
arrived in France.  
Fedi identifies as Muslim, and does his five prayers a day. On the days when he has classes and 
has to miss his prayers, he makes sure that he makes up for these during his night prayer. He 
makes a division between being in France (a country that he considers as foreign to him) and 
being in Algeria: he wears religious clothing on Fridays in Algeria while he doesn’t do this in 
France because France is a “secular country.” He finds those who decide to wear religious 
clothing in France as “not logical” and lacking in “respect [towards] the entourage.”  
Fedi believes that the generation of folks who arrived in 1960s-70s, like his parents and 
grandparents back in Algeria, had a “solid religion” which he thinks is no longer the case for the 
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“generation of 2000s” in France. He attributes this to both socialization of the younger 
generation of Muslims as well as the phenomenon of globalization.  
Hakim (80) arrived in France in 1960 at the age of 21 from a village in Algeria, pushed by the 
poverty both in his family and in his village. He worked all his life in restaurants, starting as a 
cleaner and moving up to become a cook until his retirement. He was responsible for cooking the 
main dishes and added that he never mastered the desserts. 
We spoke in a park in Barbès, an immigrant-majority area within Paris where Hakim had worked 
all his life. He had decided to not bring his children to France and to keep his family in Algeria; 
Hakim told me about the disintegration of immigrant families that he had seen around him. He 
explained the process as such: Since the financial situation of the immigrant families was 
difficult, the fathers would work all day, juggling multiple jobs. These men would have no time 
for their children or their family. Their wives would have little interaction with the society 
outside of their home and speak little French. Together, the parents would remain uncapable of 
raising children in the new environment. This would mean that the children would not inherit 
religious values and adopt deviant practices like doing drugs, drinking alcohol, and committing 
petty crime. 
At the time of the interview, Hakim spent most of his time in Algeria, frequenting France for 
medical procedures and managing retirement pensions. He is proud of his three children and 18 
grandchildren and very content of his decision to establish family in Algeria.  
Houda (mid 40s) migrated with her husband from Rabat in Morocco in 1990s. I met her, like 
many other women, at the Grand Mosque in Paris on a Friday afternoon after the khutba 
(sermon). At the time of the interview, she was working as a teacher in a primary school, a work 
83 
she seemed to enjoy. She told me how she was forced to never talk about religion and remain 
“neutral” about the topic in the classrooms. She did not wear a hijab outside of the mosque.  
While most women were undertaking individual prayers or Quranic readings, Houda was chatty 
and happily initiated a conversation with me. She complained about the women’s space in the 
basement of the mosque with no esthetic value, unlike the space for men upstairs.  
As someone who does not wear a hijab, Houda regularly confronted French-raised Muslim hijabi 
women; she felt that her authenticity as a Muslim was questioned by these Muslim women who, 
according to her, knew little about the “vrai” (true) Islam. She commented on the behavior of 
these “young” Muslims who, according to her, did not have respect towards others, especially 
their first-generation parents. Houda was aware that one of the reasons why religious authority of 
the first-generation immigrants was questioned by the French-raised youth was that the former 
had little education and hence their capacity to read the Quran or other religious texts was 
limited.  
Moussa (25) was, like his friend Ahmed, born and raised in Libya to Malian parents. He moved 
to France after getting his high school diploma from a French lycée (high school) in Libya. At 
the time of our interview, he was finishing his Master’s degree and doing an internship in a small 
firm specializing in information technology, where he hopes to have a more permanent position.  
We met for an interview in his studio located in the 18th district of Paris. He talked at length 
about the forms of discrimination he had faced while seeking employment, which he attributed 
primarily to his Muslim faith (and to his skin color to a lesser extent). He sees France as a 
“hypocritic” country because of its tension-filled relation with religion. For example, he told me 
how sad he was when a beautiful historical church in his neighborhood was destroyed to make 
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place for commercial and residential buildings; he attributed the destruction to the lack of state 
support for religion.  
Moussa thinks of himself as a believing and practicing Muslim, even though (as he mentioned) 
he does not adhere to the popularly accepted definition of being Muslim. He tries to pray when 
he can, consumes alcohol, and is fine having relations with women before marriage. He was 
critical of the French Muslims, in contrast with whom he defined his own religiosity: “I do not 
cry out loud all the time that I am a Muslim.” He told me that he had read the Quran but that he 
has always “live[d] my religion based on how I feel.”  
Moussa feels culturally French because of his education in French schools. Yet, at the same time, 
renewing visas to stay has made him realize that he is not French. 
Nada (43) arrived in France at the age of 30 from Algeria. Her migration to France was 
motivated by the conditions that her brother had faced in Algeria; he could not find a job in 
Algeria after getting two undergraduate degrees and he eventually fell into depression.  
Since her arrival, Nada has worked either as a private baby-sitter or as a domestic helper in the 
Paris region. Because of her undocumented status, she finds it difficult to find a formal 
employment. I interviewed her while she was working as a domestic help; I followed her through 
the house of an acquaintance with my recorder on, attempting to help her along the way. She 
mentioned that she had recently married a French man (second-generation) of Algerian origins 
and that she has received calls from the municipal office suspecting that her marriage was 
undertaken for the sake of French papers (marriage blanc). 
Nada does not wear a hijab but hopes to wear it someday. She does her Ramadan and considers 
herself religious. She agrees that there is a generational gap between the first-generation and 
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French-raised Muslims and attributes it to bad socialization (mauvaise frequentation) of the latter 
group. For her, both “Arabs and French” can be a bad influence on descendants of Muslim 
immigrants raised in France. 
Negar (late 20s) was born in Iran into a practicing Shia Muslim family. At the time of our 
interview, she was finishing her doctoral degree in pedagogy for teaching French and Persian as 
second-languages. 
At the time of the interview, Negar spoke “accent-less French”, a factor that contributes to her 
being identified as a second-generation Muslim by other French-raised Muslims. Between the 
ages 13 and 15, Negar spent time with her family in France, attending the local public school; 
this makes her experiences more like a 1.5 generation immigrant rather than a first-generation 
immigrant. For Negar, her experience of schooling and linked socialization has had a profound 
effect on her current religious beliefs. For example, she cites the example of the “honte” (shame) 
she felt when her mother continued to wear a traditional Iranian headscarf along with modest 
clothing while in France. While she became a practicing Muslim on her return to Iran, she has 
transitioned to having more agnostic views after her arrival in France in 2013. She does not see 
herself as Muslim and does not want to be seen as such. She has a lot of problems when Muslims 
in France assume that she is a Muslim, especially because they assume her to be Shia Muslim – 
an Islam that the Sunni-majority Muslims in France usually see as “less serious” (according to 
Negar).  
In spite of her non-affiliation with Islam today, it is clear that Negar is invested in how Islam is 
viewed in France and how it is debated within the Muslim community in France, because of her 
past religious beliefs as well as the recurrent assumption by others that she is Muslim. Negar is 
critical of how French-raised Muslims respond to the stereotypes about Muslims and Islam that 
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pervade the French public discourse: for example, she said that many of the Muslims have not 
read the religious texts and/or come to accept the presence of some “sourate” (verses) in the 
Quran that promote (according to her) hatred and which are potentially dangerous. At the same 
time, Negar understood that it was difficult to undertake this internal critique in the anti-Muslim 
political environment of France.  
Safa (34) was born and raised in Tunisia. She immigrated in 2012 with her husband who was 
offered a job in the engineering sector. We met at the Grand Mosque of Paris on a Friday after 
the afternoon prayer and we conversed over mint tea and pastries in the mosque’s café. 
In Tunisia, Safa was studying for a doctoral degree in biology which she left mid-way and then 
decided to enroll herself in an undergraduate program to study Arabic literature in Paris. She had 
two very young children (aged 1 and 3 years) at the time of the interview. 
Safa wore a hijab regularly and recounted to me the kind of police harassment she as well as her 
mother (who also wears a hijab) had faced in Tunisia before the revolution in 2011. Hijab was 
banned in the public space, and secular laws like the ones in France had existed there since the 
rule under Habib Bourguiba. We talked about the generational gap between first- and second-
generation Muslims in France, which she agreed exists. She exhibited empathy for both the 
generations, explaining to me that tensions between both the generations are common in 
immigrant Muslim families. 
Salah (mid 40s) is a first generation of Algerian origin. I met Salah at the same café in Barbès 
where I first met Hakim; like many small cafes in the area, this café was frequented by first-
generation immigrant men from North and West Africa.  
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At the time of our interview, Salah had been in France for 16 years. He was not married. He 
worked as a taxi driver or undertook deliveries of wholesale grocery stocks. Salah was very 
curious about world political events, leading to our conversations comparing India with Algeria 
for example.  
While Hakim considered himself very religious and carried himself in a manner that brought him 
a lot of respect in his community (he is also older than Salah, which might influence the level of 
respect he gets), Salah considered himself a “moderate” Muslim. His ‘moderateness’ was 
contrasted to the “extreme” religiosity that, according to him, was present among the French-
raised Muslim “youth” – he talked about the unfortunate radicalization of these youth. He said 
that the “youth” harbored ideas about Islam that made little historical or textual sense to him. He 
highlighted the stories of violence during the pre-modern period while Islam was spreading in 
Asia to drive his point that tit was pointless to be nostalgic about what is considered by youth to 
be the “golden” era of Islam.  
Sami (early 50s) is a first-generation man of Algerian origin. He left Algeria in 1992 after 
deciding to quit his position as a ship captain that he had held for 17 years.  
When I met him, he was working as firefighting “formateur” (trainer) and was very proud of his 
work. He talked at length about how he had moved to France with no resources, slept in parked 
cars, gained training as a firefighter, and received respect; his story sounded like a French 
version of ‘American dream come true.’ I met Sami in a café frequented by mostly first-
generation men of Maghrebi origin. The café also served as a spot where he would meet some of 
his students who had gone on to become his mentees.  
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Sami recounted to me many stories from his travels, the main theme of which was his deviance 
from the religious and social norms imposed upon him in Algeria. For instance, he mentioned 
how he has “known many women around the world”, and had walked away from an unhappy 
marriage in Algeria. Yet, he never forgot to repeat that he was and always will be a Muslim. He 
contrasted this to the beliefs of many French-raised “youth” of immigrant origins who would 
grow up in Muslim families and declare that they were not really Muslim. Sami did not see 
‘being Muslim’ as choice; if one if born a Muslim, he said, one remains a Muslim. He added that 
deviating from religious norms and prescriptions did not mean that one stopped being a Muslim; 
he provided his own example as someone who regularly deviated yet continued to remain a 
Muslim. 
Zeineb (74) is a first-generation Muslim woman of Algerian origin. I met her on a Friday after 
the khutba (sermon) at the Grand Mosque in Paris while she was visiting one of her sons and his 
family based in Paris. She was dressed in a manner associated with women of her age and 
generation from Algeria – her head was covered in a tight headscarf and a loose white scarf over 
it, and she wore a loose white cotton dress.  
Zeineb arrived in France at the age of 15 with her husband in 1960. Both of them worked in blue 
collar jobs in Clermont-Ferrand, like many immigrants from Maghreb. She described their 
working conditions as extremely hard. She had three children with her husband who had passed 
away a few years before we met. Her children were all married and living all around France, and 
had children of their own. Zeineb was proud of the socio-economic success of her children. For 
example, one of her sons was working as an engineer in Nice. She was glad as well that they 
were all Muslim. But she complained about their religious practices; she saw that they did not 
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necessarily pray at a frequency recommended in Islam (five times a day). She hoped that 
someday they would find the “right path” and become better practicing Muslims.  
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C.2: Second-generation immigrants
Aziza (late 50s) is a second-generation of Algerian origin. At the time of our interview, she was 
working as a coordinator for a francophone radio association. Aziza arrived in France from 
Tunisia (where her family had migrated before from Algeria) at the age of three with her parents. 
She was raised in a non-religious environment by her parents, unlike her cousins who grew up 
religious in Algeria. Once in France, she kept little contact with either Tunisia or Algeria. Her 
father died when she was 18. Her Muslim mother had become more religious in the later years of 
her life. 
When asked if she has any Muslim friends, she responded saying that she does not define her 
friends (or anybody else) as having a certain religious affiliation. Overall, she does not like to 
talk about religion. She faces a lot of awkward situations where Muslims around her assume that 
she is a Muslim (because of her darker features). For example, she recounts her encounter with a 
young (probably French-raised Muslim) woman at the canteen where she works – the woman 
mentioned that one of the preparations that she was serving contained pork. “Et alors?” (And so 
what?) – responded Aziza. She mentioned many times during our interactions that she eats pork, 
drinks alcohol, and smokes (activities not prescribed in Islam).  
While Aziza sees her upbringing as not religious, her mother maintained some religious 
practices. Like with other Muslims around her, Aziza regularly attempted to confront the 
religiosity of her mother. For instance, while she would try to not consume it around her mother, 
Aziza would keep a piece of pork in her fridge when her mother was visiting. Aziza also made 
sure that her daughter, who was dating (at the time of interview) a practicing Muslim man, did 
not fast for Ramadan; she would make her daughter consume alcoholic cocktails and pork during 
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Ramadan whenever she visited. This was to assure herself that her daughter was not 
“converting.” 
Camille (27) moved from Algeria at the age of 7 in late 1990s with her mother and two older 
sisters to join her father in France. Her father, who worked as a sports coach in Algeria, was 
threatened by Islamists groups and this led him to seek political asylum in France in early 1990s. 
Given this family history, all the members of her family had an “apprehension about Islam” 
which Camille did not have since she was too young at the time of the incidents. She grew up 
around agnostic parents, and her father “bizarrely” continued to fast during Ramadan because for 
him “traditionally, it was like this.”  
Camille “converted” to Islam at the age of 15 after reading the Quran and decided to wear a hijab 
at the age of 17. While she had excellent grades at school, the fact that she had to remove her 
headscarf, which she saw as a “part of herself”, before entering the doors of the school, was lived 
by her as a form of “violence.” She ended up marrying at age 20, having a daughter, and later 
separating from her partner. At the time of our interview, she was enrolled in an undergraduate 
program to study philosophy and attended classes on Islamic sciences at a private religious 
institute.  
Camille agrees that there is a generational gap overall, including a religious generational gap. 
She described her surprise when she found her experiences resonating with folks who were her 
parents’ age but were, like her, of second-generation.  
Fareeda (32) was born in France to parents who migrated from Pakistan. She grew up in a 
family where she was always “more religious than the rest”; for example, while her family 
members were all practicing Muslims, her mother never wore a hijab and they never did the 
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obligatory prayers daily. In her childhood, Fareeda had wished her family would pray together 
often.  
I met Fareeda for an interview in her apartment in a north-eastern suburb of Paris. At the time of 
our meeting, Fareeda wore a turban hijab and was working as a doctor of general practice like 
her friend Leila (described later in this section).  
Fareeda sees a generational gap between the religiosity of her parents and that among her 
generation. She talked about the religious education she got at home as a child, which “made the 
amalgam between religion and traditions.” She attributed this to the religious and secular 
education that her parents had received – both of them had little or no secular education and had 
received religious education through their respective families in Pakistan.  
Fareeda is very glad to have been born in France because it is there that she has the “liberty” to 
learn about her religion. She contrasts this to the hypothetical situation of her being raised in 
Pakistan; she says that she would have needed authorization from male elders to enroll herself in 
religious course while in France she can do what pleases her, be “emancipated”, and have access 
to religious education without anyone controlling her decisions.  
Farid Abdelkrim (52; real name used) is a French public figure known for his past links with 
the Muslim Brotherhood and his present mobilization against Islamism and radicalization in 
France. I met Farid at a local theatre where he was performing an anti-radicalization play titled 
Lettres à Nour (Letters to Nour) for high school students in the northern suburbs of Paris.   
Farid was born in Nantes to parents of Algerian origin. When a dear friend of his died during his 
adolescence, he turned to Islamism. He talked about how this shift had meant an important 
rupture in his life – he stopped singing (an activity he enjoyed) and he stopped having humor. 
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When he did quit the Brotherhood, he became a comedian while at the same time remaining 
Muslim. Today, he calls for “going towards internal Islam, towards prayers, [and] meditation.” 
Farid is critical of the Islamic institutions set up by first-generation Muslims in France. He sees 
their structural organization as fundamentally different from what is needed to fulfill the 
demands of the younger generation of Muslims. For him, Union of Islamic Organizations of 
France (UOIF) and Muslim Brotherhood in France are “organisation des vieux” (organization of 
the old) who are absent on the social media and out of touch with the younger generation. They 
have failed to transfer power to the younger generation. This has meant, according to Farid, that 
these institutions were surprised by the “departures to Syria” of French Muslims. The first-
generation Muslims set up Islam thinking that they were going to return to their country of 
origin, and hence, Farid pointed, the mosque sermons were in Arabic rather than in French.  
Leila (30) was born and raised in France to parents who moved from Algeria. All the members 
in her family are practicing Muslims. At the time of the interview, Leila wore a hijab tied around 
her head like a turban and was dressed formally in a loose shirt and pants. Leila studied medicine 
and worked as a general practitioner at the time of the interview. 
Leila considers herself as someone with a “double culture” and she is proud of her Algerian 
origin. She attributes this to the fact that she has a genealogy she can be proud of – her maternal 
grandfather was an imam in the village in Algeria and became an important figure in resistance 
to French occupation.  
While many of those whom I interviewed talked about the privileged position of the French-
raised Muslims in terms of their French citizenship (compared to first-generation immigrants) 
Leila was skeptical. She told me that she doesn’t not feel completely French because the society 
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demands of her to “always do more, to adapt myself more and even then, it is not sufficient.” She 
added that this is because “the question of origin always comes up but then I am not really 
Algerian either.” But in terms of racism faced, she agrees that those of her parents’ generation 
faced more racism than their descendants – they were discriminated “everywhere they went” 
because in many places, they were the only minority family or individual present.  
Overall, Leila thinks that it is hard to feel a complete sense of belonging as a Muslim in France 
because the “ethnic French” (français de souche) have come to frame the drinking of alcohol, 
eating of pork, and wearing short skirts with “French values” in a way that alienates practicing 
Muslims.  
Souleymane (38) was born in France to parents who migrated from Senegal. His great-
grandfather already had French citizenship papers considering that where he lived in Senegal 
was a French department.  
According to Souleymane, his parents moved to France in order to find work and open up 
opportunities for their children. His family considers themselves “Pan-Africanists” and have 
remained loyal in their heart to the continent. “Anti-African politics” of France for Souleymane 
remains a continuous memory; yet, in everyday life, he reconciles it with his French citizenship 
by arguing that most French individuals are neither aware of nor implied in the politics of the 
French state. 
Souleymane sees many differences between Islam of the first-generation immigrants and that of 
the French-raised Muslims, in terms of practices as well as institutions. While Islam of the 
former is a “foreign religion of foreigners in France,” Islam of French-raised Muslims is a 
“French religion.” This he attributes to the difference in education received by the first 
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generation in their country of origin, versus the education received by their descendants in 
France. The latter group, while being privileged, face discrimination in the education system 
because of immigrant descent.  
Souleymane is aware of the bad reputation of the French-raised Muslims, especially men raised 
in the banlieues (suburbs). Many first-generation Muslims, Souleymane tells me, wish that they 
had never arrived in France after knowing what happened to their children’s generation. They 
see all French-raised children of immigrants as either turning to crime (for men) or to 
prostitution (for women). But he argues that the failure of this generation is not a majority trend: 
“Un arbre qui tombe fait plus de bruit que toute une forêt qui pousse,” (a tree that falls makes 
more noise than an entire forest that is growing) says Souleymane about the negative reputation 
of French-raised Muslims. That a few French-raised Muslims are “falling” doesn’t mean that all 
of them are falling, he added.   
Yasmine (28) was born and raised in France to parents who moved from Algeria. Her father had 
moved with her mother to undertake doctoral studies in mathematics but never managed to finish 
his degree. In her childhood, the family lived in residences reserved for immigrant families in the 
suburbs of Paris. Because of the uncertainty of her father’s employment as a school teacher, they 
had few resources.  
Yasmine had a master’s in literature and was preparing to apply for a doctoral program at the 
time of our interview. She attributes her love for literature to her father taking her and her 
siblings to public libraries in her childhood.  
In addition to seeing the first-generation religiosity as “traditional” and linked to “culture” of the 
country of origin, Yasmine also sees another difference between the religiosity of first-
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generation and French-raised Muslims: those of first-generation do not differentiate between 
those who are simply “believing” Muslims (croyant) and those who are “practicing” Muslims 
(pratiquant). For example, first-generation Muslims would never say “I am not a practicing 
Muslim” even if they do not pray frequently. She attributes this to the community-facing values 
of the first-generation in contrast to the individualized values of French-raised Muslims.  
Yassine (33) moved to France from Morocco at the age of three with his parents. At the time of 
our meeting, he was heading a religious association, quitting his work as an engineer, and going 
back into higher education to study social sciences. We met for an interview in a café in Paris 
where he talked at length about the philosophy of religion and the link between Cartesian 
thought and Islam.  
Yassine is very critical of the institutionalization of Islam in France, an enterprise run mostly by 
first-generation Muslims in France. It is to respond to his spiritual needs and that of his 
generation that he set up a religious association. He sees the importance of the “Cartesian 
rationality” and “doubt” as fundamental to the development of a spiritual being and, to this end, 
he along with his association members organize religious discussions and debates about key 
issues faced by Muslim youth. In our later interactions, he mentioned that he was setting up a 
research group to reconceptualize mosques in France; he is interested in making them spaces that 
are more inclusive, have gender-mixed spaces, are not dominated by singular ethnic group, and 
are environmentally friendly and esthetically beautiful.  
Yassine dislikes Muslims who appear to be “cool Muslims” and who appear integrated in the 
society (“qui montre une patte blanche”; someone who shows a white paw) by saying things like 
“I am Muslim, but I drink alcohol.” He finds it unfortunate that many of these Muslims go to the 
extent of “eating pork even if it tears them inside.”   
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C.3: Third-generation immigrants
Asma (27) is a daughter of a second-generation immigrant father and a first-generation 
immigrant mother, both of whom come from the south of Morocco. We met in a café in a 
northern suburb of Paris close to where she spent her childhood and where she currently lives 
with her parents. 
At the time of the interview, Asma had a master’s degree and was working in a French public 
school. She wears a hijab, except when she teaches because the French law prohibits the wearing 
of hijab by students and staff in French public schools. She had grown accustomed to this 
process given that the 2004 law banning the hijab was passed while she was herself in school. 
Asma told me about the differences between her first-generation mother and her second-
generation father; for her, their relation with religion was an important aspect of the difference. 
She told me how her father kept religion “private” and “at home” while her mother liked to 
discuss religion with others at her local mosque. For her, this was linked to the kind of 
upbringing her parents had received: her mother having grown up in Morocco while her father 
having grown up in France. Asma complained that her mother and members of her maternal 
family were “traditional” and didn’t “like to mix people” of different genders while her father 
would let her play football as a child with other children of different genders. She reasoned that 
this was linked with the “confusion” between “religion and tradition” that her mother and others 
in her maternal family had inherited from their Moroccan upbringing. Her own opinions 
regarding religion are closer to her father’s according to Asma. 
Asma is proud of her Berber heritage and added that her family, overall, is more tolerant: “We 
are not Arab people [and] that is why the mentality is very different.” 
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Lina (26) describes herself as a “second-generation French” of Algerian origins and rejects the 
term “third-generation immigrant.” Both her parents were born in France to parents who had 
moved from Algeria to find work. At the time of the interview, Lina was working in the legal 
department of a private company and held a master’s degree. 
For Lina, the life trajectories of first-, second-, and third-generation immigrants are different 
from each other: the first-generation do not want to “catch attention” either politically or 
religiously because they “don’t feel at home” in France; the second-generation assert their 
political rights because they “are French”; and the third-generation like her are “more religious” 
because they are “a bit lost and [so] they need to identify with something.” She also added that 
almost all French-born children and grandchildren of immigrants face a similar sense of being 
“lost” and feeling “rejected by the French society”; this can have an effect of them turning to 
religion with more intensity. 
Lina talked extensively about her family, describing the religious generational gap between her 
paternal grandparents and her father as significant while that between her mother and her 
maternal grandparents as non-existent. She attributes this to the difference in religious education 
each parent received: her paternal grandfather, Lina mentioned, is a “traditional” and 
“paternalistic figure” who is very religious while her mother’s father is the kind “you can call 
anytime” and is not as religious as the paternal grandfather.  
Marie (30) is a third-generation of Algerian origins. She divides her time making and teaching 
art. She lives with her Buddhist German partner who works at a center teaching meditation. 
Marie’s maternal grandmother arrived in France in 1950s with three children, with little material 
and social capital. As someone who was “darker than the Arabs,” she faced a lot of 
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discrimination. Marie compares the lives of Muslims in France with the life of her grandmother, 
who was a practicing Muslim. For example, she feels angry when the “bourgeoise” French-
raised Muslim women go to Algeria and “come back wearing a headscarf.” She sees that these 
women have the “luxe” (luxury) to choose to wear a headscarf while many women are forced to 
wear them. She narrates how the freedom to choose that women in France have is not what her 
grandmother had; her grandmother faced a lot of familial resistance when she decided to marry a 
German soldier, for example. At the same time, Marie recognizes that many women in France 
wear headscarves as a form of “rebellion” against the anti-Muslim sentiments in France. 
While her grandmother was a practicing and believing Muslim, Marie and her mother did not 
inherit the religious affiliation. Yet, they did not choose the path of atheism either, with both 
maintaining a form of “croyance” (belief). Marie’s father has no immediate immigrant origins. 
Like Negar and Aziza, Marie is confronted by many Muslims who assume that she is a Muslim 
because of her Afro hair. She feels that they seek to govern her behavior, judging her when they 
feel that she is not following the norms demanded by Muslim faith. As a result of this, she said 
that she cut her hair very short so that no one could notice her Afro.  
Sophie (29) is a third-generation woman of Algerian origins. Sophie has a master’s degree in 
communication and was working as a communication manager for a company at the time of our 
interview.  
Sophie’s maternal grandparents arrived in France via Tunisia when Sophie’s mother Aziza (see 
interview in the earlier section) was a child. Her maternal grandmother was a practicing Muslim 
who, according to Sophie, started wearing hijab after a trip to Mecca. Her Tunisian grandfather, 
on the other hand, was not very religious; Sophie mentioned that he drank alcohol, for example. 
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Like many other French-raised Muslims, she sees first generation Muslims as “more into 
[religion] because of tradition” while the French-raised Muslims are “freer [than the first-
generation and] free to make our choice.” Her father, she told me, is a non-religious French man 
of “Catholic background” who has separated from her mother.  
At the start of our conversation, Sophie identified herself as an atheist. But she later revealed that 
she had said the shahada (attestation of her faith in Allah) for her partner who is a second-
generation Muslim and with whom she had been in couple for ten years at the time of the 
interview. She added that she was “not serious in her religious convictions” and suspects that her 
partner knows about it.  
Sophie breaks the stereotypical association between Arab name, Maghrebi origins, and affiliation 
to Islam. As someone who has Maghrebi features and identifies as Arab yet at the same time has 
a French-sounding name and does not have a clear affiliation with Islam, she faces many 
judgmental comments from the Arabo-Muslim community. For example, she has been told that 
she “is not Arab because you eat pork.” While Sophie doesn’t define herself as Muslim, she has 
“more sensibility towards this religion and when it is attacked, it gets on my nerves.”  
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APPENDIX D: LOGIT REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR PEW (2006) and TeO (2008) DATA 
Importance of 
religion in life
Do you generally 





Quality of life for 
Muslim women in 



















   Male ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
   Female -0.172 1.371*** -0.324 0.147 0.572 -0.095 -0.285
Age 0.029** -0.068** 0.033** -0.005 0.051*** 0.04* 0.061*** -0.016
Education level 0.159* -0.209 0.075 0.034 0.39*** 0.246 0.236** -0.063
Married -0.286 0.856* 0.043 0.0452 0.364 -0.143 -0.365 0.051
Generation
   First-generation ref. ref. 0 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
   Second-generation 0.288 -0.748* 0.173 0.011 -0.15 -2.127*** -0.609* -0.725**
Sample Size 399 204 397 398
Which of these do you trust the most to offer you guidance as a 
Muslim? (sample: 397)
Pew (2006) survey containing data on 200 foreign-born and 199 French-born Muslims
Note: The significance is indicated as follows: *** indicated p < 0.01; ** indicated p < 0.05, and * indicated p < 0.1. 
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Muslim women in 
France taking on 
modern roles in society
Influence of music, 
movies, and 
television on Muslim 
youth 




Opinion: Is suicide 
bombing and other 
forms of violence 
justified?
Is there struggle 
between moderate 
Muslims and Islamic 
fundamentalists?





Muslim and living 
in modern society
Gender
   Male ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
   Female -0.192 -0.09 -0.189 -0.239 0.520* 0.13 -0.307
Age 0.011 0.008 0.024* 0.008 -0.011 0.014 -0.011
Education level 0.083 0.335*** 0.097 0.195* -0.022 0.278 -0.237**
Married 0.328 0.415* -0.132 0.439 -0.369 0.13 0.021
Generation
   First-generation ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
   Second-generation 0.29 0.618** 0.402 -0.167 -0.291 0.535 -0.737**
Sample Size 390 399 398 395 395 217 398
Pew (2006) survey containing data on 200 foreign-born and 199 French-born Muslims
Note: The significance is indicated as follows: *** indicated p < 0.01; ** indicated p < 0.05, and * indicated p < 0.1. 







































   Male ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
   Female 0.151 0.416*** 0.778*** -0.394*** 0.811*** -1.604*** 0.221* -0.169 -0.052 0.264** 
Age -0.01 -0.037*** 0.039*** 0.042*** 0.027 0.068*** 0.032*** 0.004 -0.033** -0.022**
Education level -0.026 -0.047** -0.01 0.066** 0.024 0.096** 0.064** 0.092*** 0.112*** -0.042
Married -0.017 0.399*** -0.339*** -0.515*** -1.104*** -0.315 -0.250* 0.417*** 0.032 0.507***
Employment
   Unemployed ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
   Employed -0.187 -0.289** 0.17 0.569*** -0.21 0.904*** -0.129 -0.234 0.146 -0.202
   Student Status 0.118 -0.162 0.05 0.195 -0.897* 0.955*** 0.017 -0.017 0.299 -0.039
Generation
   First-generation ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
   Second-generation -0.426*** -0.022 -0.045 -0.24 -0.234 -0.073 0.084 -2.211*** 1.616*** -0.432***
Sample size 4885 4884 4882 4895 4907 4801 4909 2286 2286 4217
TeO (2008) survey containing data on 2,674 foreign-born and 2,397 French-born Muslims
Note: The significance is indicated as follows: *** indicated p < 0.01; ** indicated p < 0.05, and * indicated p < 0.1. 
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